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“THE JUDGE SAID, ‘SON, WHAT IS
YOUR ALIBI . . . ?’” A SURVEY OF
ALASKA CRIMINAL DISCOVERY
PRINCIPLES†
JAMES FAYETTE*
ABSTRACT
In this Article, the Author provides a general overview of the Alaska law of
criminal discovery. The Article first discusses the prosecutor’s discovery
obligation and then discusses the major aspects of Rule 16 of the Alaska Rules
of Criminal Procedure and how Alaska courts have interpreted these
provisions. The final part of the Article discusses a variety of issues
Copyright  2009 by James Fayette.
†
See LEFTY FRIZZELL, THE LONG BLACK VEIL (Cedarwood 1959). This
Article’s title is from the lyrics to the bluegrass ballad, The Long Black Veil. The
song’s narrator is accused of murder, but he refuses to reveal his alibi, even as
his execution nears:
The judge said son what is your alibi
If you were somewhere else, then you won’t have to die.
I spoke not a word, though it meant my life
For I’d been in the arms of my best friend’s wife.
As we will see, under Alaska law, the protagonist could have steadfastly refused
to answer the judge’s question for reasons unrelated to chivalrous discretion—
up until the moment he called his paramour as a defense witness at trial. See
Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774, 787 (Alaska 1974). However, timely pre-trial notice of
his intent to assert an alibi defense would have been required. See ALASKA R.
CRIM. P. 16(c)(5).
* The author is a prosecutor with the State of Alaska, Department of Law
in Anchorage. He has served as the supervisor of the special prosecutions
section of the Office of Special Prosecutions & Appeals, as an assistant district
attorney at the Anchorage District Attorney’s Office, and in the U.S. Army Judge
Advocate General’s Corps at Fort Richardson, Alaska. He previously published
a survey of Alaska self-defense law. James Fayette, “If You Knew Him Like I Did,
You’d Have Shot Him, Too...” A Survey of Alaska’s Law of Self-Defense, 23 ALASKA L.
REV. 171 (2006).
This Article is a revision of a paper originally prepared for presentation
at the May 2008 Alaska Bar Association Convention. Because the author is a
state prosecutor, this article reflects a prosecutorial focus. However, the author
hopes this survey will be useful to the criminal defense bar and the bench as
well.
The opinions expressed here are the author’s alone. This paper is not a
policy statement of the State of Alaska, Department of Law.
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commonly encountered by criminal law practitioners, including discovery of
juror information, the timing of discovery disclosures, and information the
prosecution is not required to disclose.
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INTRODUCTION
Modern criminal law practitioners cannot approach the subject of
pre-trial discovery without acknowledging a debt to the late Supreme
Court Associate Justice William Brennan. In an influential 1963 lecture,
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Justice Brennan argued that defense discovery should be expanded to
help turn the criminal trial from a sporting contest into a search for the
truth.1
Justice Brennan’s call for expanded pre-trial discovery has
prevailed in Alaska criminal practice, at least for the defense bar. In
Alaska state courts, criminal defendants have far broader rights of pretrial discovery than do those in federal courts. However, in day-to-day
Alaska state criminal practice, discovery disputes are still common.2
Disputes over discovery scope, timing, and sufficiency are daily
topics in Alaska state court pre-trial hearings. This survey of Alaska’s
criminal discovery court rules and case law is intended as an aid to our
criminal bench and bar. As with my previously-published survey of
Alaska self-defense law, this survey is a practitioner’s guide. Aside from
a few practical suggestions, there is no normative argument presented
here. My intent is to provide criminal law practitioners and the criminal
bench with a fairly comprehensive survey of court rule and case law
authority that defines the scope of both prosecutors’ and defense
attorneys’ criminal discovery obligations.
This survey is organized as a section-by-section survey of Alaska’s
primary discovery court rules followed by a topical survey. Part I briefly
surveys the sources of the prosecutor’s discovery obligations. Parts II,
III, and IV examine Rule 16 of the Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure.
These sections collect and annotate significant reported and unreported3
appellate opinions that have interpreted each subsection. Part V is a
topical survey of commonly encountered issues that appear in practice.

1. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or
Quest for Truth? A Progress Report, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 2 (1990). Brennan argued
that expanded pre-trial discovery would dispel the notion that a criminal trial
was a game, and that review of the state’s case would be of greatest value to
indigent defendants who often could not afford their own investigation.
Brennan also argued that expanded disclosure of the defendant’s case to the
prosecution might cause more cases to be resolved short of trial. Id. at 285–88.
2. In August 2008, the Alaska Criminal Justice Working Group concluded
that discovery delay constituted the greatest impediment to efficient criminal
case processing and also contributed to overcrowding in pretrial jail facilities.
Memorandum from Larry Cohn, Executive Director, Alaska Judicial Council to
Christine Johnson, Alaska Court System (Aug. 19, 2008) (on file with author). But
see Improving Criminal Caseflow Management in the Alaska Superior Court in
Anchorage; Technical Assistance Report, Table 4 (Jan. 30, 2009) (finding that
discovery caused delay in 8.7% of felony trial cases, falling behind “new
attorney” (19.3%), “motions” (14.5%), “new agency” (9.2%), and equal to
“defense attorney unready” (8.7%) as a source of trial delay).
3. This outline cites many unreported opinions. The court of appeals has
held that litigants may cite unpublished opinions, not as binding precedent, but
for “whatever persuasive power” the opinion may hold. McCoy v. State, 80 P.3d
757, 764 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
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I. THE PROSECUTOR’S DUE PROCESS DISCOVERY OBLIGATIONS
AND ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS
The place to begin any examination of a prosecutor’s due process
and ethical responsibilities is Justice Sutherland’s oft-quoted description
of the role of a prosecutor:
The [prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern
at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is
not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. . . .
while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike
foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper
methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to
use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.4
A. Constitutional Sources of the Prosecutor’s Discovery Obligation
A prosecutor’s obligation to disclose exculpatory information to a
criminal defendant is not rooted in state or federal court rules, but rather
in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. A defendant’s
constitutional right to prepare and present a full defense at trial entitles
him to disclosure of exculpatory and impeachment evidence.5
In Brady v. Maryland,6 the defendant and his accomplice were found
guilty of murder in the first degree and were sentenced to death.7 They
were convicted at separate trials.8 At his trial, Brady testified and
admitted his participation in the crime but claimed that his accomplice
was the actual killer.9 Prior to Brady’s trial, his lawyer demanded to
examine his accomplice’s police statements.10 Several were shown to
him, but the prosecution withheld one statement in which the
accomplice admitted the actual homicide.11 The prosecution did not
disclose the statement until after Brady had been tried, convicted,
sentenced to death, and had his conviction affirmed.12

4. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
5. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976); Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963).
6. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
7. Id. at 84.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, found that due process was
violated where the prosecution suppresses evidence which is either
material to guilt or to punishment, regardless of the good faith or malice
of the prosecution: “Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted
but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of
justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.”13
In Giglio v. United States,14 the Court expanded this rule to cover
exculpatory impeachment evidence.15 Next, in United States v. Agurs,16
the Court further extended the Brady principle and held that a
prosecutor has a constitutional duty to voluntarily disclose exculpatory
information to the defense, even in the absence of a specific defense
request.17 Finally, in Kyles v. Whitley,18 the Court held that the prosecutor
has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to others acting on
its behalf in the case, including the police.19
The Brady-Giglio-Kyles rule thus extends the prosecutor’s obligation
to not only ensure that all exculpatory information is provided to the
defense but also undertake reasonable steps to ensure that the
prosecutor is aware of all such material in the government’s possession.
Because this line of cases stems from the defendant’s Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, the prosecutor’s obligation
is independent of any state discovery court rule or statute.
B.

A Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty: Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct
3.8(d)

In addition to a prosecutor’s due process obligations, Alaska’s
Rules of Professional Conduct impose an ethical duty upon prosecutors
to disclose exculpatory or mitigating evidence to the defense.20

13. Id. at 87.
14. 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
15. Id. at 154.
16. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
17. Id. at 111–13; see also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985)
(abolishing distinction between the defense’s specific and generalized requests
for disclosure).
18. 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
19. Id. at 437.
20. Anecdotally, it seems no Alaska prosecutor has ever faced professional
discipline for violations of this rule. According to Bar Counsel Steve Van Goor,
complaints filed under this rule with the Alaska Bar Association are infrequent,
and none has ever resulted in formal professional discipline. E-mail from Steve
Van Goor, Bar Counsel, Alaska Bar Ass’n, to Author (Sept. 17, 2008) (on file with
author). Mr. Van Goor has been bar counsel since 1983.
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Rule 3.8 of the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct (Special
Responsibilities of a Prosecutor) states that a prosecutor in a criminal
case shall:
make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or
information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the
guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection
with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all
unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor,
except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by
a protective order of the tribunal . . . .21
Therefore, the prosecutor is ethically bound to make available to
the defense evidentiary material that must be disclosed under the due
process requirements established in Brady and Alaska Rule of Criminal
Procedure 16(b)(3). Interestingly, at sentencing, the professional
responsibility rule requires disclosure of mitigating information to the
court as well as to the defendant. In contrast, the criminal procedure rule
only requires disclosure to the court if new information emerges at
trial.22

II. A SURVEY OF CRIMINAL RULE 16: WHAT DISCLOSURE IS
EXPRESSLY REQUIRED BY ALASKA’S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RULE?
Discovery in criminal cases is governed by Criminal Rule 16.23
Alaska’s Criminal Rule 16 was promulgated by supreme court order and
became effective in 1973.24 The supreme court essentially adopted most

21. ALASKA R. PROF. CONDUCT 3.8(d). This rule remained unchanged through
the recent major revision of Alaska’s professional legal ethics code. See
Rescinding the Current Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct & Readopting
New Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct, Supreme Court Order 1680, effective
Apr. 15, 2009, http://state.ak.us/courts/sco/sco1680.pdf.
22. Compare ALASKA R. PROF. RESP. 3.8(d) (disclosure to court and defense at
sentencing), with ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(3) (disclosure only to defense), and
ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(2) (disclosure to court only if newly discovered
information emerges in trial).
23. Criminal discovery practice is not governed by the Alaska Rules of Civil
Procedure. Thomas v. State, No. A-6015, 1997 WL 235504, at *9 (Alaska Ct. App.
May 7, 1997) (“Discovery in criminal cases is not governed by Civil Rules 26 et
seq., but rather by Criminal Rule 16(b)–(d).”); Jerrel v. State, Nos. A-3380, A-3873,
1992 WL 12153274, at *1 (Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 4, 1992) (criminal discovery rules
govern criminal cases), rev’d on other grounds, Allen v. Municipality of
Anchorage, 168 P.3d 890 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007).
24. Supreme Court Order 157, effective Feb. 15, 1973. Alaska Supreme Court
Order 157 is only available in print at the Anchorage, Fairbanks, and Juneau law
libraries. Copies can be obtained by contacting the Anchorage Law Library. See
http://state.ak.us/courts/sco.htm.
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of the provisions of the 1970 American Bar Association Standards for
Criminal Justice, “Discovery and Procedure Before Trial,” Standard
2.1(a).25
With the 1973 enactment of Criminal Rule 16, the largely “oneway” traffic pattern of Alaska’s criminal discovery process was set:26
criminal defendants were granted broad criminal discovery rights but
bore few obligations in return. The new rule required the prosecutor to
disclose, for the first time, names and addresses of prospective
witnesses, written or recorded witness statements, defendant and codefendant statements, and expert reports.27 In contrast, the defendant
was merely required to submit to non-testimonial identification
procedures and to provide notice of intent to raise an insanity defense;
disclosure of prospective defense expert witnesses was discretionary.28
As we will see, this traffic pattern resembles a busy commuter highway
at morning rush hour: most information heads “inbound” in the defense
direction, and little traffic flows the other way. With few exceptions, that
portrait remains essentially unchanged today.
A. Witness Identity, Statements, and Criminal Conviction Records
Criminal Rule 16(b)(1) states that the prosecutor shall disclose:
(i)

The names and addresses of persons known . . . to have
knowledge of relevant facts and their written or recorded
statements or summaries of statements;29
(ii) Any written or recorded statements and summaries of
statements and the substance of any oral statements made
by the accused;
(iii) Any written or recorded statements and summaries of
statements and the substance of any oral statements made
by a co-defendant;

25. See Sivertsen v. State, 963 P.2d 1069, 1072 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998),
disapproved in part on other grounds, 981 P.2d 564 (Alaska 1999).
26. Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774, 784 (Alaska 1974) (“[P]retrial criminal
discovery is not a ‘two-way street.’”).
27. Supreme Court Order 157, supra note 24.
28. Id.
29. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.060 (2008) (“After a witness called by the state
has testified on direct examination, the court shall, on motion of the defendant,
order the state to produce any statement of the witness in the possession of the
state that relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified. If the
entire contents of the statement relate to the subject matter of the testimony of
the witness, the court shall order it to be delivered directly to the defendant for
examination and use.”).

FAYETTE_FINAL.DOC

2009

5/8/2009 2:30:56 PM

CRIMINAL DISCOVERY SURVEY

55

(iv) Any books, papers, documents, photographs or tangible
objects, which the prosecuting attorney intends to use in
the hearing or trial or which were obtained from or
belong to the accused; and
(v) Any record of prior criminal convictions of the defendant
and of persons whom the prosecuting attorney intends to
call as witnesses at the hearing or trial.30
As explained above, Alaska’s discovery rule was based on the 1970
American Bar Association (ABA) Standards. However, in this very first
substantive section, we encounter some critical differences between the
ABA Standards and the Alaska rule. For example, the ABA Standards
required the prosecutor only to disclose the statements of persons the
prosecutor “intended” to call at trial.31 If the prosecutor subjectively
decided not to call the witness (or so claimed later), then the witness’s
statement need not be disclosed. The Alaska Supreme Court specifically
rejected this limitation when it adopted Alaska Criminal Rule 16. Under
the rule, the triggering criterion is relevance, not the prosecutor’s
intent.32
Second, the ABA Standards only required disclosure of a codefendant’s statement if the trial was to be a joint trial.33 In addition, the
ABA Standards required disclosure of “written or recorded
statements.”34 The Alaska rule broadened this requirement to include
“written or recorded statements or summaries of statements” of
defendants and co-defendants.35
Despite these changes, the Alaska rule retained an important
distinction regarding disclosure of unrecorded, non-codefendant
witness statements. The Alaska Supreme Court followed the ABA
Standards and omitted the phrase “the substance of any oral
statements” from section (b)(1)(i). 36
In other words, the prosecutor is required to disclose “written and
recorded statements” of all persons with knowledge of relevant facts.

30. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(A).
31. See Howe v. State, 589 P.2d 421, 424 (Alaska 1979) (explaining the
distinction between the ABA Standard and the Alaska rule).
32. Id.
33. Shaw v. State, No. A-3697, 1992 WL 12153173, at *9 (Alaska Ct. App. May
6, 1992).
34. Howe, 589 P.2d at 424.
35. Shaw, 1992 WL 12153173, at *9 (explaining these distinctions between the
1970 ABA Standards and Alaska Criminal Rule 16).
36. Id. (explaining why the Government was not required to create and
disclose the “substance,” or a summary, of a witness’s unrecorded oral
interview).
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Yet, the prosecutor must disclose “summaries of statements and the
substance of any oral statements” only of the accused and any codefendant.37 This quirk governs a frequently encountered criminal trial
practice issue: the prosecutor’s obligation to disclose new information
revealed in a pre-trial, unrecorded interview with a percipient witness.
The rule’s first clause requires disclosure of the names and
addresses of witnesses and disclosure of their “written or recorded”
statements. However, the rule does not require disclosure of the
“substance” of a mere witness’s oral statement. The court of appeals
discussed this distinction in Sivertsen v. State.38
Sivertsen was charged with burglary.39 At trial, a witness testified
that the hammer and knife Sivertsen possessed when arrested came
from inside the burglarized premises.40 The prosecutor learned this
inculpatory fact when he interviewed the witness a week before trial but
did not disclose this fact to the defense.41 When the prosecutor elicited
these facts at trial, the defense alleged a discovery violation.42 The court
of appeals rejected the claim, explaining that the prosecutor had no duty
to disclose a summary of an unrecorded oral statement made during a
trial preparation interview.43
As the Sivertsen court recognized, this quirk creates the potential for
a clever prosecutor to avoid disclosure and cultivate unfair surprise by

37. See Hampton v. State, 623 P.2d 318, 319–20 (Alaska 1981) (finding error
where police chief did not inform prosecutor or defense attorney of an
unrecorded oral statement of the accused and police chief disclosed the
statement in response to cross-examination question in the midst of trial); see also
Marshall v. State, 198 P.3d 567, 574 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008) (holding a state’s
failure to disclose a recorded interview with a cooperating informant constituted
a discovery violation). Where a pretrial interview discloses a statement
attributable to the defendant, reported by a third-party witness, the substance of
that statement is discoverable, whether the witness’s interview is recorded or
not. Id.
38. 963 P.2d 1069, 1071–72 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998), disapproved in part on other
grounds, 981 P.2d 564 (Alaska 1999) (holding that Criminal Rule 16(b)(1) does not
normally require a prosecutor to disclose oral statements made by a witness
during a trial preparation interview); see also Nook v. State, No. A-7837, 2004 WL
1336268, at *5 (Alaska Ct. App. June 16, 2004) (same); Buie v. State, No. A-4706,
1995 WL 17220362, at *10–11 (Alaska Ct. App. Mar. 29, 1995) (applying this
principle and finding no violation where prosecutor failed to disclose content of
fifteen minute mid-trial conversation with state’s expert medical examiner);
Shaw, 1992 WL 12153173, at *7–10 (discussing this point at length).
39. Sivertsen, 963 P.2d at 1070.
40. Id. at 1070–72.
41. Id. at 1071.
42. Id. at 1070–71.
43. Id.
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doggedly refusing to record or create a written “summary” of an oral,
unrecorded, pre-trial witness interview.44
In fact, the court of appeals had squarely confronted this allegation
years earlier in Elson v. State.45 In Elson, the victim of a sexual assault
initially lied to police when she denied that she had been using cocaine
with Elson before the sexual assault.46 The victim admitted this lie on
cross examination, but the prosecutor rehabilitated her testimony by
asking, “Did you, within a short time after that, call our office to indicate
that you had not told the truth about the slip of cocaine?”47 The victim
said she had.48
Elson’s counsel objected and alleged a discovery violation.49 She
argued that she had planned her whole attack on the victim’s credibility
based on the victim’s failure to candidly disclose drug use.50 She claimed
that the prosecutor’s rehabilitation had ambushed her because the
prosecutor had never disclosed the victim’s self-report.51
The court of appeals held that there was no discovery violation
because the victim’s self-report was not reduced to writing.52 In other
words, because the informal telephone call was (seemingly) not
documented in writing or tape-recorded, the failure to disclose the
statement did not run afoul of Rule 16.
However, Elson’s appellate attorney raised a powerful argument:
the prosecutor’s office must have reduced the victim’s self-report to
writing in some form.53 How else could the prosecutor have been able to
provide the approximate time frame of the self-report telephone call in
his rehabilitating question? In fact, Elson’s appellate attorney pointed
out that the prosecutor had referred to the date of the victim’s telephone
call during argument.54 Unfortunately, the court of appeals dodged this
issue and held that Elson had not raised this precise argument in the
trial court.55 The issue had been litigated in the trial court as if the self-

44. See id. at 1072 (“We recognize that this interpretation of Criminal Rule
16(b)(1)(i) could be abused.”).
45. Nos. A-2898, A-4297, 1993 WL 13156823 (Alaska Ct. App. Jul. 28, 1993).
46. Id. at *2 n.1.
47. Id. at *11.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at *12.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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report was not reduced to writing; therefore, Elson had waived the claim
on appeal.56
Do Alaska’s criminal rules offer any remedy to this problem? Yes.
Although Rule 16(b)(1) does not require the prosecutor to create and
disclose a witness’s pre-trial interview,57 Rule 16(b)(3) (and Brady itself)
do require disclosure of “exculpatory” information—whether the
prosecutor has reduced it to writing or not.58 Therefore, a prosecutor
may not wear Sivertsen or Elson on her sleeve: if her pre-trial interview
discloses exculpatory information, she must disclose it to the defense
attorney.59
Moreover, if the prosecutor learns new facts in a pre-trial (or midtrial) posture and fails to disclose those facts to the defense based on an
expansive reading of Sivertsen, she may be in tiger country. Why?
Because it is impossible for a prosecutor to conclusively predict whether
a reviewing judge or appellate court will decide that the newly disclosed
information was not exculpatory when made. The cautious prosecutor
should avoid a charge of sharp discovery practice by creating a
summary of the interview (perhaps even an informal one) and
disclosing it to the defense.
Next, prosecutors should be mindful that courts have found error
where the prosecutor failed to disclose clearly discoverable information
such as the accused’s own statements and written summaries of witness
statements.60 As the Rule makes explicitly clear, the government has a

56. Id. at *14 n.5. Elson is an easy opinion to criticize. The victim’s report of
mutual drug use could easily be characterized as “exculpatory” or “mitigating”
within the meaning of Rule 16(b)(3). Therefore, it should have been disclosed to
the defense.
57. Sivertsen v. State, 963 P.2d 1069, 1072 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998), disapproved
in part on other grounds, 981 P.2d 564 (Alaska 1999).
58. See infra Part II.D.
59. See Latonio v. State, No. A-4147, 1993 WL 13156678, at *1 (Alaska Ct.
App. May 19, 1993) (discussing approvingly a trial judge’s ruling that Rule 16
required disclosure of exculpatory information regardless of whether a written
summary had been prepared).
60. Hampton v. State, 623 P.2d 318, 319–20 (Alaska 1981) (finding violation
of Rule 16(b) where the evidence in question was an undisclosed oral statement
of the defendant, although this was not considered reversible error); Stevens v.
State, 582 P.2d 621, 624–25 (Alaska 1978) (holding that government’s failure to
reveal the prior statements of a defense alibi witness was reversible error);
Mahle v. State, 371 P.2d 21, 22–24 (Alaska 1962) (holding that police reports of
oral statements by witnesses should have been disclosed under former statute
governing discovery); Braaten v. State, 705 P.2d 1311, 1320 (Alaska Ct. App.
1985) (“The two page report submitted by the prosecutor was apparently a
summary of G.J.’s statements to the police concerning her activities during the
period Braaten claimed he met her. The complaining witness, G.J., was clearly a
person ‘known by the government to have knowledge of relevant facts,’ so that
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duty to make pretrial disclosure of all “summaries of statements and the
substance of any oral statements made by the accused.”61 Most
commonly, this rule will trigger disclosure of statements made by an
accused directly to a law enforcement officer.62 However, it is unclear
whether a statement that is made in open court, and therefore equally
available to all parties, must be disclosed in formal criminal discovery.63
The government’s duty to disclose names of witnesses “known” to
have relevant evidence is broad and includes persons “known” to have
relevant information, even if the police conclude that the witness’s
information is cumulative of other witnesses, and they decline to
formally interview the witness.64
The government’s duty to disclose information under this
subsection is self-executing, and it may not rely on the defense’s failure
to make a specific request.65

the summary of her statements on any area of the investigation would seem to
fall within the scope of Criminal Rule 16(b)(1)(i).”).
61. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(A)(ii).
62. Alaska law has long required that a suspect’s custodial interrogation in a
place of detention be audio recorded. Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1159–60
(Alaska 1985).
63. Riney v. State, 935 P.2d 828, 838 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997) (where the
accused made inculpatory statements to the magistrate at his bail hearing, “it
was just five dollars’ worth [of cocaine] I just forgot it was in my pocket . . .”; the
prosecutor noted the statements in her file, but did not disclose them to the
defense lawyer until trial; the defendant was not entitled to suppression of the
statements; court characterized the discoverable nature of the in-court
statements as “a close question.”).
64. See, e.g., Jurco v. State, No. A-4983, 1995 WL 17220755, at *2–4(Alaska Ct.
App. Apr. 5, 1995) (requiring state to turn over identity of witness when state
knows of witness and there is “substantial probability” that witness has
knowledge of facts of case, even if state declines to interview witness). This
principle applies only where the police have actually gathered the questioned
evidence or are actually aware of the identity of the particular witness. Due
process does not require the police to use state-of-the-art investigative
techniques in every reported crime, or to actually gather the names of every
conceivable witness at every crime scene. But, “[e]vidence in question should
not be destroyed based on an investigating officer’s evaluation of its usefulness.”
Catlett v. State, 585 P.2d 553, 558 n.5 (Alaska 1978). See also Singleton v. State, 921
P.2d 636, 639–40 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996) (finding no due process violation where
police failed to record names of bystanders at crime scene). Cf. Nicholson v.
State, 570 P.2d 1058, 1064 (Alaska 1977) (requiring the state to track down “every
conceivable investigative lead” would be an “extremely difficult burden for the
state”); March v. State, 859 P.2d 714, 716 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993) (the due process
clause does not require a state-of-the-art investigation of all crimes).
65. Rodes v. City of Kenai, No. A-5536, 1996 WL 33686482, at *4–5 (Alaska
Ct. App. Feb. 21, 1996) (holding that prosecution may move for ex parte, in
camera review and may seek restriction or deferral, but the burden is on the
prosecution to take those steps).
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A prosecutor may not suppress Rule 16(b)(1) evidence by styling
the information as “rebuttal” testimony. That was apparently the rule in
Alaska between 1975 and 1979 but has now been overruled.66
What about the discoverability of witnesses’ “full arrest record”?
Rule 16(b)(1)(A)(v) only requires disclosure of “convictions,” and then,
only of “persons whom the prosecuting attorney intends to call as
witnesses at . . . trial.”67 What if the defense demands a printout of “all
police contacts” or “all arrests”—whether or not the contact resulted in a
conviction? Such a request would be beyond the scope of Rule
16(b)(1)(A)(v). But, if a defender articulates particular relevance (or
“materiality”) to the arrest record of a particular witness (such as a
police informant), the request would fall within the scope of Rule
16(b)(7).68 The rule’s link between the prosecutor’s subjective intention
and her disclosure obligation is problematic. The Howe court articulated
the flaw with tying a discovery obligation to the prosecutor’s subjective
intention. The rule mistakenly assumes that at an early stage in the case,
the prosecutor will be able to predict, with precision, the identity of the
witnesses she intends to call months later at trial. But, as the Howe court
explained, this is often not the case. A prosecutor often cannot predict
witness availability and degree of witness cooperation at an early stage
of the litigation.69 Also, in street crime prosecution, given the volume of
casework in a hectic prosecution office, serious trial preparation does
not occur until shortly before trial.70 Additionally, the defense is not
required to reveal its specific defense theory until ten days before trial.71
Each of those variables may change the precise identity of trial
witnesses.
For example, in Coney v. State,72 the defense demanded a copy of
the robbery victim’s full arrest record because, according to the defense,
the victim fabricated the robbery report.73 The trial judge refused to
order its production.74 On appeal, the court of appeals remanded,
reasoning that if the victim had reported a crime or had been a suspect,

66. See Bostic v. State, 805 P.2d 344, 346 n.4 (Alaska 1991) (overruling old
rule and not allowing prosecutor to suppress self-styled rebuttal evidence);
Howe v. State, 589 P.2d 421 (Alaska 1979) (overruling McCurry v. State, 538 P.2d
100 (Alaska 1975)).
67. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(A)(v).
68. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(7).
69. Howe, 589 P.2d at 424 n.7.
70. Id.
71. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(c)(5).
72. 699 P.2d 899 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
73. Id. at 900.
74. Id. at 901.
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the printout might have led to impeachment evidence.75 Because the
court could not determine what all the abbreviations on the police
printout meant, it could not determine whether the printout was
discoverable and remanded to allow the defense to inspect the printout
and argue its materiality.76 Contemporary Alaska criminal defense
practitioners often rely on Coney when seeking full arrest records of state
witnesses.77
In Braham v. State,78 the supreme court confronted a similar
problem.79 Police reports that revealed a critical prosecution witness’s
dealings with the police as an informant in drug cases had been
withheld from the defendant.80 The court held that the reports should
have been disclosed “because they showed that [the witness] was deeply
involved in working for the police, which would create the material
inference that he might be biased in favor of the prosecution.”81
Thus, defense counsel should argue that Braham supports a defense
request for reports involving an informant’s participation in an
undercover operation. Defense counsel should also cite Coney and Rule
16(b)(7) in support of a request for full arrest records of important
witnesses. Prosecutors should argue that these cases are limited to
critical government witnesses and should review a defense discovery
demand for a showing of “materiality.”82 Prosecutors should argue for
in camera review under Rule 16(d)(6)(i) of the Alaska Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
B.

Government Expert Disclosure

Rule 16(b)(1)(B) states that, “as soon as known and no later than 45
days prior to trial,” the prosecutor shall disclose: (1) The name and
address of each expert witness who performed work in connection with
the case or who is likely to be called at trial; (2) Any reports or written
statements of the expert; (3) A curriculum vitae; and (4) A “written
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. As a practical matter, Coney’s impact has been blunted over time. The
Alaska Public Defender Agency and the Alaska Office of Public Advocacy’s
investigative staffs now have online access to the full arrest and conviction
records of every criminal defendant in Alaska via the Alaska Public Safety
Information Network (ASPIN) database. See Ingles v. State, Nos. A-6157, A-3731,
1997 WL 796504, at *1–2 (Alaska Ct. App. Dec. 24, 1997) (mentioning Public
Defender Agency APSIN access).
78. 571 P.2d 631 (Alaska 1977).
79. Id. at 641–48.
80. Id. at 642–43.
81. Id. at 647.
82. See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(7).
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description of the substance of the proposed testimony of the expert, the
expert’s opinion, and the underlying basis of that opinion.”83
This rule has sanction and timing components. The court may
impose sanctions, including preclusion, for violations.84 Absent contrary
specific order, government expert discovery is to be accomplished no
later than forty-five days prior to trial.85
Prosecutors should note that the rule’s first clause is written
disjunctively; it directs discovery of experts who are likely to be called or
who have performed work on the case.86 In other words, if expert work
yields seemingly inconclusive results, the expert’s identity, report, and
resume must be discovered. The prosecutor may not suppress the
results because she regards the test as “neutral” or inconclusive and
then subjectively abandons any intent to call the expert at trial.87
The court of appeals has questioned whether the expert discovery
rule pertains to testimony from a police officer who testifies as an
“expert” based upon police experience. In Collins v. State,88 the court of
appeals expressed doubt that expert discovery rules applied to a police
detective who testified about the similarity of crack houses to the
defendant’s apartment.89 “[I]t is not clear to us that Criminal Rule
16(b)(1)(B) applies to police officers, like Bryant, who testify to their onthe-scene observations and conclusions based on their training and
experience.”90 Collins and Basurto v. State91 are consistent with an
emerging line of cases that hold police officers and other professionals
who offer opinion testimony based on a combination of on-scene

83. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(B).
84. Id. Criminal Rule 16(e) also authorizes sanctions for “willful” discovery
violations. See Davis v. Superior Court, Fourth Judicial Dist., No. A-3114, 1990
WL 10509739, at *1 (Alaska Ct. App. June 13, 1990) (affirming $25 sanction
against the Fairbanks District Attorney).
85. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(B). Notwithstanding the rule’s text, the court
of appeals held that the remedy for late notice under this rule is a continuance,
not preclusion. Bourdon v. State, Nos. A-7689, A-7699, 2002 WL 31761482, at *5–
6 (Alaska Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2002).
86. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(B).
87. Mujahid v. State, No. A-9573, 2008 WL 4757152, at *2–4 (Alaska Ct. App.
Oct. 29, 2008) (holding that whether crime lab result was “neutral” or
“exculpatory” was irrelevant and the test result was discoverable pursuant to
ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(B)).
88. 977 P.2d 741 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
89. Id. at 745.
90. Id. (failing to decide this issue, noting that the proper remedy for noncompliance with discovery under this rule would have been a continuance).
91. No. A-8010, 2003 WL 23011812, at *8 (Alaska Ct. App. Dec. 24, 2003)
(police sergeant testimony that did not rest on scientific research “does not
appear to be the type of ‘expert’ testimony covered by the pre-trial discovery
provisions of Alaska Criminal Rule 16(b)(1)(B )”).
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observation, training, and experience are not “experts” to whom full
pre-trial disclosure obligations apply. These witnesses are deemed to be
“hybrid” witnesses, exempt from Rule 16 disclosure obligations.92
Must each expert witness supply the defense with the scientific
studies that support her expert opinion? The court of appeals has
implied, at least in a case where an expert has not relied “on any
particular study,” that the answer is no.93
C.

Informant and Surveillance Information

Rule 16(b)(2) states that the prosecuting attorneys shall inform
defense counsel:
(i)

of any relevant material or information relating to the guilt
or innocence of the defendant which has been provided by
an informant, and
(ii) of any electronic surveillance, including wiretapping, of
(aa) conversations to which the accused or the accused’s
attorney was a party, [and]
(bb) premises of the accused or the accused’s attorney.94
Note that search warrant disclosure should be addressed at the
charging stage. Alaska Criminal Rule 37(e)(2) requires that the
prosecutor shall disclose the court numbers of all search warrants “in
relation to the case” on the “initial charging document,” unless the court
waives this requirement for “good cause shown.”95
In a situation involving an ongoing criminal investigation
(especially if the safety of confidential informants or undercover officers
is involved), the prosecutor should seek an ex parte, in camera order
92. See Getchell v. Lodge, 65 P.3d 50, 55–56 (Alaska 2003) (state trooper who
offered his opinion of cause of traffic collision based on his on-scene
observations and training was a "hybrid" witness); Voyles v. State, Nos. A-9377,
A-9397, 2008 WL 4951416, at *8 (Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2008) (police crime
scene analyst); Hunter v. State, No. 8868, 2007 WL 2405208, at *12–13 (Alaska Ct.
App. Aug. 22, 2007) (specially-trained sexual assault nurse).
93. Calix v. State, No. A-6854, 1999 WL 34002417, at *4–5 (Alaska Ct. App.
Oct. 13, 1999) (rejecting claimed discovery violation where expert relied on
examination of the victim and on her years of professional experience and not
upon any “particular studies”); Bremond v. State, No. A-5019, 1994 WL
16196672, at *2 (Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 23, 1994) (affirming admission of expert
testimony about scientific studies even though the studies had not been
disclosed in pretrial discovery).
94. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(2).
95. The court rule governing the content of the initial charging document
repeats this requirement. See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 3(e) (requiring complaint to
have “a listing of the numbers of any search warrants issued in relation to the
case”).
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deferring discovery pursuant to Alaska Criminal Rule 16(d)(4) and
(6)(ii).96
D. All Exculpatory Evidence
Rule 16(b)(3) states, “The prosecutor shall disclose to defense
counsel any material or information within the prosecuting attorney’s
possession or control which tends to negate the guilt of the accused as
to the offense or would tend to reduce the accused’s punishment
therefor.”97
This rule is really a codification of the Brady-Giglio holdings.98 In
Batson v. State,99 the Alaska Supreme Court stated that this rule
essentially parallels Brady and held that the prosecution was required to
disclose the record of undercover narcotics officers’ “non-drug” expense
logs in the course of an investigation.100 Batson relied on an entrapment
theory and hoped to establish that the undercover officers “bought” the
defendants’ trust and friendship over a five-month period by giving
them gifts, loans, drinks, and promises of financial reward.101 The court
held that denial of the discovery request was error, citing this rule.102
E.

The Extent of the Prosecutor’s Obligation
Rule 16(b)(4) states:
The prosecuting attorney’s [discovery] obligations extend to
material and information in the possession or control of
(i) members of the prosecuting attorney’s staff, and
(ii) any others who have participated in the investigation or
evaluation of the case and who either regularly report or
with reference to the particular case have reported to the
prosecuting attorney’s office.103

96. See infra Part IV.D.
97. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(3).
98. See supra Part I.A.
99. 568 P.2d 973 (Alaska 1977).
100. Id. at 980.
101. Id. at 978–79.
102. Id. See Elson v. State, Nos. A-2898, A-4297, 1993 WL 13156823, at *14
(Alaska Ct. App. July 28, 1993) (stating that Rule 16(b)(3) and Brady had the same
function: requiring disclosure of exculpatory evidence). The court said that
“even though Rule 16(b)(1)(i) does not require disclosure of [informal pretrial]
oral statements . . . due process still limits the prosecutor’s ability to withhold
the details of witnesses’ statements from the defense”). Id.
103. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(4).
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The government’s discovery obligation extends to the police
agency responsible for investigating the case. Under this rule, the
knowledge of the officer is essentially imputed to the prosecution.104
In Butler v. State,105 the court of appeals considered mid-trial
disclosure of a 911 dispatch log.106 The case arose from Palmer, where an
interagency office maintains the 911 emergency communications center.
In Butler, the 911 logs precisely identified the date and time of a citizen’s
complaint of a man exposing himself to children,107 but the dispatch log
was only discovered and disclosed in the midst of Butler’s trial.108
Clarifying the date and time of the exposure event, the log powerfully
corroborated the witness’s trial testimony.109
Writing for the court, Judge Mannheimer noticed and commented
upon an intriguing aspect of the case: at trial, the parties simply assumed
that knowledge of the dispatch log was imputed to the prosecution
under Criminal Rule 16(b)(4)(ii) and was therefore subject to automatic
pretrial disclosure.110 The judge implied that the imputed-knowledge
conclusion was unsound and that the interagency group which operated
the regional 911 switchboard might not fall within the ambit of Rule
16(b)(4)(ii).111 However technically intriguing, the approach Judge
Mannheimer tacitly suggests is not persuasive. The record of the case
was clear that the interagency communications center “participated in
the investigation” and “had reported” to the prosecutor’s office in the
sense that multiple 911 calls triggered the police investigation.112 It is

104. Hampton v. State, 623 P.2d 318, 320 n.1 (Alaska 1981) (police chief’s
knowledge of unrecorded statement of defendant imputed to prosecution);
Russell v. Anchorage, 626 P.2d 586, 590–91 n.14 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981); see also
O’Neill v. State, 675 P.2d 1288, 1292 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984) (Singleton, J.,
concurring) (writing for himself, Judge Singleton concluded, intriguingly, that
this issue was governed by agency principles, and that an officer’s “private
audio recording” of a disputed arrest, which he made to protect himself from
civil lawsuit, was not within the “scope of his employment,” and therefore, the
State’s discovery obligation did not attach to the tape; in view of the sparse
subsequent citations to Judge Singleton’s concurrence, his approach does not
seem to have achieved broad acceptance).
105. No. A-5399, 2008 WL 4890238 (Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2008).
106. Id. at *1.
107. Id. at *6–7.
108. Id. at *1.
109. Id. at *7–13. Butler argued that the mid-trial disclosure of the dispatch log
prejudiced him because it undercut his alibi defense. Id. at *1. The court of
appeals ultimately rejected this claim, noting that Butler had elected to proceed
to trial, even though he knew that there was considerable imprecision regarding
the date of the offense. Id. at *12.
110. Id. at *10.
111. Id.
112. Id. at *2; ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(4)(ii).
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equally clear that the center had a close working relationship with the
investigating police agency and the district attorney’s office.113
A ruling that the 911 emergency communications center was not
subject to Rule 16(b) discovery would frustrate the rule’s fundamental
purposes: facilitation of informed pleas, expedition of trial, and
minimization of trial surprise.114 The ruling would also trigger
indefensibly contrary results in Alaskan communities like PalmerWasilla, where the 911 center is staffed by interagency personnel, and
Anchorage, where a single municipal police agency staffs the 911
emergency center. Therefore, if this issue is ever squarely presented in
another case, a prosecutor should assume that a trial judge would
impute knowledge of 911 emergency dispatch center data to the
prosecuting agency under Rule 16(b)(4)(ii).
F.

The Defense Power to Compel Production of Favorable
Information
Rule 16(b)(5) states that:
Whenever defense counsel designates and requests production
of material or information which is not in the possession or
control of the prosecuting attorney but would be discoverable
if in the possession or control of the prosecuting attorney, the
court shall issue suitable subpoenas or orders to cause such
material to be made available to defense counsel.115

This rule, combined with Criminal Rule 16(b)(7) (which requires a
showing of “materiality”) and with Criminal Rule 17(c), gives the
defense broad powers of subpoena and protects a defendant’s due
process and compulsory process rights.116
Where the police have not collected evidence and the defense seeks
it, the proper procedural vehicle is a defense motion for a Rule 17(c)

113. Butler, 2008 WL 4890238, at *6–7 (describing prosecution’s free access to
911 dispatch database).
114. See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(a).
115. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(5).
116. See Page v. State, Nos. A-3551, A-5754, 1997 WL 45119, at *5–6 (Alaska
Ct. App. Feb. 5, 1997) (holding that defendant was “probably entitled” to an
order for a subpoena compelling sexual victim’s physician to disclose her
prescription records for in camera inspection). The Page court noted that Alaska
Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c) contemplates document “production before the
court” and the court’s determination regarding further disclosure to the parties,
not direct delivery by the custodian to an attorney. Id. at *6 n.7.
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subpoena deuces tecum, issued under authority of Rule 16(b)(5).117 In
Short v. Municipality of Anchorage,118 the defendant requested security
tapes that were not collected by the police department, and, by the time
of trial, the parties learned that one security camera had malfunctioned
and the other tape had been erased.119 The court of appeals found no
discovery violation because the police had no duty to collect the tapes as
evidence and Short offered no “explanation why he could not have
subpoenaed the tapes earlier under Criminal Rule 17.”120
In Fathke v. State,121 the court of appeals relied on Rule 17(c) and
held that a defendant may invoke it to compel an order requiring “other
suspects” to submit to non-testimonial identification procedures.122
Fathke sought an order to compel a specific third party to provide inked
fingerprint and palm print samples.123 The defense argued that the third
party was responsible for a latent print left on an item at the scene of a
robbery, but the trial court denied the motion.124 The court of appeals
reversed, finding the denial an abuse of discretion.125 Fathke is an
important Rule 17(c) case. Every defender should have its holding in her
back pocket.
G.

Search, Seizure, and Witness “Relationship” Information
Rule 16(b)(6) states that:
[T]he prosecuting attorney shall, upon request of defense
counsel, disclose and permit inspection, testing, copying and

117. Rule 16(b)(5) is not an unlimited license for a defense demand for
production of every imaginable document. The rule requires a showing that the
information sought, “would be discoverable if in the possession or control of the
prosecuting attorney . . . .” Id. Therefore, if the document would not have been
discoverable under Rule 16(b), the defense may not rely upon Rule 16(b)(5).
Rather, the defense must make a reasonable showing of “materiality” under
Rule 16(b)(7).
118. Nos. A-6825, A-3982, 1999 WL 60993 (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 10, 1999).
119. Id.
120. Id. Here is a clear example of what could have been a proper defense use
of Rule 16(b)(5) and Rule 17(c). If the police had seized these tapes, they would
clearly have been discoverable under Rule 16(b)(1)(ii)–(iii) (recorded statements)
and probably also under Rule 16(b)(1)(iv) (photographs or documents intended
to be introduced by prosecution at trial). Therefore, had the defender spotted the
issue before trial, the tapes would have been a proper subject of a Rule 16(b)(5)
and Rule 17(c) subpoena.
121. 951 P.2d 1226 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
122. Id. at 1229–30.
123. Id. at 1227–28.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1230.
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photographing of any relevant material and information
regarding:
(i) Specified searches and seizures;
(ii) The acquisition of specified statements from the accused;
and
(iii) The relationship, if any, of specified witnesses to the
prosecuting authority.126
This rule essentially codifies Giglio because “the relationship”
between witnesses and the prosecuting authority refers to incentives or
inducements to testify. Note that the rule does not distinguish between
tacit “deals” or express ones. If the witness has been extended any
promise or inducement, Giglio, its progeny, and this rule require
disclosure of those facts to the defense.127
In “undercover informant” and “ongoing investigation” scenarios,
this rule will often implicate the government’s ability to seek ex parte, in
camera review of the relationship between cooperating witnesses and
the police under Rule 16(d)(6). The Alaska Supreme Court has approved
resolution of “informant” issues, ex parte, and in camera.128
H.

The Discovery Obligation Does Not Extend to the Prosecutor’s
Work Product

Rule 16(b)(8) states that the prosecutor is not required to disclose
“legal research or of records, correspondence, reports or memoranda to
the extent that they contain the opinions, theories or conclusions of the
prosecuting attorney or members of the prosecuting attorney’s legal
staff.”129
The court has relied on this rule to affirm denials of defense
requests to compel production of a prosecutor’s proposed list of
questions to an expert witness,130 in-house potential juror voir dire

126. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(6).
127. See, e.g., Carman v. State, 604 P.2d 1076, 1080–82 (Alaska 1979) In this
case, the Alaska Supreme Court reversed a murder conviction when the
prosecutor failed to disclose that the informant, who was later a trial witness,
sought a reward when he contacted the police and was subsequently paid $1500
shortly after trial. Id. at 1079–80. The court concluded that the error was
compounded by the prosecutor’s closing argument, in which he suggested that
the informant “had no motive to lie.” Id. at 1080.
128. See Braham v. State, 571 P.2d 631, 643 (Alaska 1977) (approving use of ex
parte, in camera hearings to resolve issues regarding informants and ongoing
investigations).
129. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(8).
130. Thomas v. State, No. A-6015, 1997 WL 235504, at *8–9 (Alaska Ct. App.
May 7, 1997).

FAYETTE_FINAL.DOC

2009

5/8/2009 2:30:56 PM

CRIMINAL DISCOVERY SURVEY

69

information,131 and the chief investigating officer’s in-court notes made
during trial.132

III. WHAT INFORMATION MUST THE DEFENSE GIVE THE
PROSECUTOR? CRIMINAL RULE 16(c)
Alaskan defendants have never been subject to broad disclosure
requirements of their defense investigations, work product, or planned
cases-in-chief. Scott v. State133 is the seminal Alaska case regarding
defense pre-trial disclosure. In Scott, the Alaska Supreme Court found
that a trial court’s order compelling broad discovery of the defense
case134 violated the defendant’s right to remain silent under Article I,
section 9 of the Alaska Constitution.135 However, the court upheld a
pretrial order requiring the defendant to disclose his intention to present
an alibi defense, reasoning that the general nature of the trial defense
was analogous to a “pre-trial plea” and therefore was not privileged.136
In 1995, the Alaska Supreme Court expanded defendants’ pre-trial
discovery obligations. The court amended Criminal Rule 16(c) to require
criminal defendants to disclose the general nature of some statutory and
special trial defenses, provide increased expert discovery, and surrender
physical evidence.137 In addition, criminal defendants may be subject to
non-testimonial identification orders.138

131. Ingles v. State, Nos. A-6157, A-3731, 1997 WL 796504, at *2 (Alaska Ct.
App. Dec. 24, 1997); Hiser v. State, No. A-4980, 1994 WL 16196673, at *1 n.1
(Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 23, 1994).
132. Smith v. State, No. A-6183, 1997 WL 688646, at *2 (Alaska Ct. App. Nov.
5, 1997).
133. 519 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1974).
134. These include: the names and addresses of defense witnesses (other than
the defendant), any written or recorded witness statements, and a list of places
the defendant claimed to have been pursuant to his alibi defense. Id. at 786.
135. Id. at 786–87.
136. Id. at 787.
137. See Amending Criminal Rule 16 Concerning Discovery in Criminal
Cases, Supreme Court Order 1191, effective July 15, 1995. For a discussion of the
1995 amendments to Rule 16, and the unsuccessful 1994 to 1996 attempts to
impose an “opt-in, opt-out” reciprocal discovery system in Alaska, see Cameron
J. Williams, Note, Sidestepping Scott: Modifying Criminal Discovery in Alaska, 15
ALASKA L. REV. 33, 45–49 (1998). The 1995 amendments to Rule 16(c) discussed in
this section are the sole surviving legacy of the 1994 to 1996 discovery reform
initiative.
138. See Supreme Court Order 1191, supra note 137.
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A. Non-testimonial Identification
Criminal Rule 16(c) provides that the prosecutor is entitled to court
orders mandating that the defendant submit to a variety of nontestimonial identification procedures. The rule grants a judge authority
to order a defendant to appear in a line-up; speak certain words; provide
fingerprints; pose for photographs; try on articles of clothing; provide
fingernail scrapings, blood, hair and other biological evidence; provide
handwriting; and permit body inspections.139 But the rule requires a
probable cause finding that the defendant is a member of a “narrow
focal group” who could have committed the offense and that the
evidence cannot be obtained from another source.140
Therefore, in practice, this aspect of Criminal Rule 16 is practically
useless to a prosecutor. Why? An application pursuant to this rule offers
the chance for the defense to actively oppose and delay the prosecutor’s
request. Also, Rule 16 has no application in cases where a defendant has
not yet been formally charged with a crime.141 Therefore, Rule 16(c) nontestimonial identification procedures will rarely be invoked for an
obvious reason: fundamental fact-gathering regarding the perpetrator’s
identity should have been gathered before the charging decision was
made, not afterwards. In practice, a prosecutor (or a detective) seeking
to gather non-testimonial identification evidence will seek a search
warrant rather than apply for a Rule 16(c) order.142
B.

Defense Expert Disclosure

No later than thirty days before trial, the defense is required by
Criminal Rule 16(c)(4) to provide expert discovery to the prosecution.143
This rule applies to any expert the defendant is “likely” to call, and
includes any written statement or report by the expert, a curriculum
vitae, a written description of the substance of his testimony, his

139. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(c)(2).
140. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(c)(1).
141. See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 1 (stating that criminal procedure rules govern
practice and procedure in all criminal court “proceedings,” implying that the
rule’s discovery procedures are inapplicable to uncharged cases).
142. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.35.020(4) (2008) (stating that a judge may issue a
search warrant for seizure of evidence tending to show the identity of a
perpetrator). No provision of Alaska law prohibits a prosecutor from seeking a
search warrant to further a criminal investigation even after formal charges are
filed. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.35.010–020 (2008).
143. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(c)(4).
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opinion, and the underlying basis of the opinion.144 The rule includes a
preclusion component for failure to comply with the rule.145
The court of appeals recently construed this rule’s “preclusion”
clause in Harris v. State.146 In Harris, the defense lawyer did not disclose
a medical expert’s report to the prosecutor until the first day of trial, in
derogation of this rule and contrary to the judge’s specific order.147 The
judge found that the defense’s failure was specifically intended to obtain
tactical advantage and precluded the expert from testifying to any
matter that was not in the defense lawyer’s previous, cursory
memorandum to the prosecutor.148
On appeal, Harris argued that the preclusion order violated his
constitutional right to present a defense.149 The court of appeals noted
that in 1995, the supreme court amended Criminal Rule 16 to expressly
include preclusion clauses in both the government and defense expert
disclosure rules.150 The court of appeals held that preclusion under Rule
16(c)(4) was only permissible upon a judicial finding that (1) the
defense’s violation of the duty of disclosure was “willful” and (2) lesser
sanctions (such as a continuance) are inadequate to cure the prejudice to
the government and to ensure future discovery compliance.151
Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial judge’s preclusion order.152 The
Harris court also sustained Rule 16(c)(4)’s preclusion clause in the face of
a direct constitutional attack.153
A related defense expert disclosure issue develops when the
defense does not give notice to the prosecution of its intent to interject
expert themes into the case. For instance, what if the defense plans to
argue “absence of scientific evidence” as a theme at trial? In other
words, what if the defense plans to argue that sophisticated scientific
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Harris v. State, 195 P.3d 161, 169–71 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008).
147. Id. at 169–71.
148. Id. at 170–71.
149. Id. at 180–81.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 178–79.
152. Id. at 180 (“[W]hen a trial judge is confronted with willful disobedience
to discovery rules and orders, the judge is not required to keep delaying the trial
to protect the offending party's interest in a full hearing of the evidence. Rather,
the judge has the discretion to order the trial to go forward with abridged
evidence.”).
153. Id. at 181; see also Earl v. State, No. A-7385, 2002 WL 531097, at *4–5
(Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2002) (affirming trial judge’s order precluding out-ofstate defense forensic testing of murder weapon by defense expert, where
defense expert report would not be received until a few days before trial;
defense had more than seven months to prepare case and no good reason why
forensic testing could not have been pursued more timely).
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testing was available to the police, but the police neglected to use it?
Often, the defense will pursue this theme without providing notice that
it intends to call an expert to explain why the scientific evidence would
have been relevant. The problem is then compounded if the government
gives mid-trial notice of a rebuttal expert.
French v. State154 is illustrative. There, the defendant was tried for a
gunshot assault.155 In her opening statement, the defense lawyer accused
the police of a shoddy investigation and claimed that the police never
performed gunshot residue tests on her client’s hands.156 She argued that
these tests could have shown that her client was not the shooter.157 In
response, the prosecutor stated that she intended to call a State Crime
Lab expert to testify that these sorts of gunshot residue tests were
unreliable and were not typically used by Alaska law enforcement.158
The defense objected because the prosecution had given no notice of
intent to call the expert before trial.159
In his majority opinion, Judge Mannheimer held that the
prosecution had no reason to know that it would need expert gunshot
residue testimony or that it would be relevant, until the defense offered
its theory of an inadequate investigation.160 Therefore, the trial judge
was within his discretion to relax the usual expert witness disclosure
deadline set by Criminal Rule 16(b)(1)(B).161
The French holding makes sense. “Absence of forensic evidence”
can be a powerful defense theme.162 However, an attorney may not rely
upon popular conceptions (or misconceptions) of how probative the
questioned scientific evidence might be. Instead, the lawyer should
properly file notice of the expert and then call the expert to explain the
scientific principles in play to the jury. So, for instance, in the French
case, the defense lawyer should have filed notice of an independent

154. No. A-7861, 2002 WL 54619 (Alaska Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2002).
155. Id. at *1.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at *2.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at *2 n.1 (holding that Rule 16(b)(1)(i), as applied to lay witnesses,
does not require the government to disclose before trial “the names of rebuttal
witnesses whose knowledge was not thought to be germane to the case until a
position taken by the defense during trial made it so”).
162. This conclusion is especially true given the continued debate
surrounding the so-called “CSI effect,” whereby the popular crime sleuth drama
series seems to have artificially elevated jurors’ expectations regarding the
swiftness, certainty, and availability of forensic testing. See Tom R. Tyler,
Review, Viewing CSI and the Threshold of Guilt: Managing Truth and Justice in
Reality and Fiction, 115 YALE L. J. 1050, 1083–84 (2006).
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expert to testify that gunshot residue tests were available and could
have detected gunpowder residue (or its absence) on a suspect’s hands.
The defense attorney could then have called the investigating officer and
elicited testimony that the forensic testing could have been done, but
was not. Had French’s defense attorney adopted this tactic, she would
have then been entitled to argue a powerful “sloppy investigation”
theme to the jury. But French’s lawyer did not do that. She simply
waited until her opening statement and sprang the forensic expert issue
upon the prosecution. Therefore, the French court correctly ruled that the
government should be fairly permitted to call an expert to explain that
such tests were, in actuality, of very little value.163
C.

Notice of Defenses

Criminal Rule 16(c)(5) requires the defense to inform the
prosecution of the general nature of the defense no later than ten days
before trial.164 The rule requires notice of “the defendant’s intention” to
rely on alibi, justification (self-defense), duress, entrapment, or any other
statutory or affirmative defense.165 The rule states that defense notice of
mental disease or defect or diminished capacity defenses is governed by
statute.166 The defense’s failure to comply authorizes the court to grant
the prosecution a continuance, or, if a continuance is inadequate, to
“impose other sanctions” or preclude the defense.167
The pre-1995 version of this rule only required notice of an insanity
defense.168 However, in 1974, a trial court order requiring disclosure of
intent to assert an alibi defense (a precursor to the present rule) survived
a direct constitutional attack in Scott v. State.169 In Scott, the supreme
163. See also Hunter v. State, No. A-8868, 2007 WL 2405208, at *14–15 (Alaska
Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2007) (finding no discovery violation where prosecution gave
mid-trial notice of intent to call a police vice detective to explain the prevailing
street price for commercial sex because the state was not placed on notice that
testimony about street prostitution prices would be relevant until the sexual
assault defendant ran a “commercial sex” defense at trial) (citing Howe v. State,
589 P.2d 421 (Alaska 1979)).
164. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(c)(5).
165. Id.
166. Id. Notice of diminished capacity and insanity defenses must be
provided “within ten days of arraignment” absent a finding of good cause.
ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.47.010(b), 12.47.020(a) (2008).
167. May a judge preclude defense witnesses from testifying to an alibi if the
judge finds a willful failure to provide pretrial notice? In a pre-1995 case, the
court of appeals faced this issue, characterized it as “close,” and dodged it.
Sellers v. State, No A-1454, 1988 WL 1511370, at *2 (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 24,
1988) (declining to decide this issue).
168. See Williams, supra note 137, at 49 n.109.
169. 519 P.2d 774, 787 (Alaska 1974).
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court held that the general nature of a defendant’s trial defense was not
privileged because it was analogous to a pre-trial plea.170
However, the Scott court also held that a broader pre-trial order,
which compelled disclosure of places the defendant claimed to have
been, violated the defendant’s right against self-incrimination.171 In 1997,
the supreme court reaffirmed Scott and found the legislature’s initiative
to mandate reciprocal discovery in criminal cases a violation of the state
constitution.172
What if the defense seeks to tactically thwart the purpose of Rule
16(c)(5)’s disclosure requirement and files an intentionally overinclusive notice? For instance, what if a defense lawyer in a murder case
opts to “play it safe” and file pre-trial notice of self-defense and alibi?
One of those two defenses might be true, but they both are obviously
not. What if a defense attorney goes a step further and files a notice
which boldly asserts that the defendant “may intend” to assert one of a
dozen affirmative defenses and every single justification theory
recognized in Title 11? How could a prosecutor contend with such an
over-designation tactic?
The best answer combines a professional responsibility component
with a tactical threat. The Alaska Code of Professional Conduct states
that lawyers may not knowingly violate the rules of a tribunal and must
make reasonably diligent efforts to comply with the opponent’s proper
discovery requests.173 Nor may an attorney make a false legal or factual
statement.174 The prospect of professional discipline should be
reinforced with a very real threat that a disingenuous pleading itself
may be admissible as a jury exhibit.
“[W]hen an attorney makes a formal statement in a brief or an incourt stipulation, that statement constitutes an admission.”175 Such
evidence would not violate the defendant’s right against selfincrimination.176 The drafters of Criminal Rule 16(c)(5) clearly
170. Id.; see also Case v. Municipality of Anchorage, 128 P.3d 193, 195–96
(Alaska Ct. App. 2006) (affirming the trial court’s finding in a speeding ticket
case that there was no apparent infringement upon the privilege against selfincrimination, as the “‘meritorious defense’ rule merely requires defendants to
give advance notice of their general theory of defense”).
171. Scott, 519 P.2d at 787.
172. State v. Summerville, 948 P.2d 469, 469–70 (Alaska 1997) (per curiam).
173. ALASKA R. PROF. CONDUCT 3.4(c)–(d); Supreme Court Order 1690,
effective Apr. 15, 2009.
174. ALASKA R. PROF. CONDUCT 3.3(a)(1).
175. David v. State, 123 P.3d 1099, 1102 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005); see also
Brigman v. State, 64 P.3d 152, 166–67 & n.28 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003) (collecting
cases).
176. Scott, 519 P.2d at 787 (Alaska 1974) (holding that court ordered disclosure
of intent to assert alibi did not violate right against self-incrimination).
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contemplated the admissibility of the defense notice, because an early
draft of this proposed rule provided that the notice would not be
admissible against the defendant if withdrawn at least ten days prior to
trial.177 The current version of Criminal Rule 16(c)(5) does not expressly
address withdrawal or admissibility of the notice as a trial exhibit.
Nevertheless, a prosecutor faced with over-designation may legitimately
counter with a David-Brigman178-based motion to admit the document as
a jury exhibit.
Trial practitioners should note that mere compliance with the
notice provision of this rule does not automatically entitle the defendant
to a jury instruction on the asserted defense. The defendant must still
offer trial evidence to meet his burden of pleading and proof. If the
defendant fails to meet that burden, the trial judge may deny a jury
instruction on the asserted defense.179
D. Physical Evidence
Criminal Rule 16(c)(6) requires defense counsel to “immediately”
notify the prosecutor of defense acquisition of physical evidence.180 It
requires surrender within a “reasonable” time and prohibits defense
testing or alteration of the physical item without prior notification to the
prosecution and the reasonable opportunity for court action.181 The
defense must reveal all information regarding the manner in which the
items were obtained and handled, “unless that information is
privileged.”182 Finally, the rule provides that if the evidence is ultimately
presented to a jury, the jury may not be informed that the evidence was
obtained from the defense.183

177. Letter from criminal rules committee member Judge Charles R. Pengilly
to Assistant Public Defender Randall Patterson, September 12, 1994, page 2
(containing text of proposed Rule 16(c)(5): “Evidence of the notice provided
pursuant to this provision is not admissible against the defendant if withdrawn
at least ten days prior to trial.”) (copy on file with author).
178. See David, 123 P.3d 1099; Brigman, 64 P.3d 152.
179. Marshall v. State, 198 P.3d 567, 573 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008) (“. . . the fact
that a defendant has given pretrial notice of that defense under Rule 16(c)(5)
does not exempt him from the rule that, if there is no evidence offered to
support each element of the proposed defense, a trial judge need not instruct the
jury on that defense”).
180. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(c)(6).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
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This rule, enacted in 1995 and substantially revised in 2001,184
codified the holding of Morrell v. State,185 which held that a defense
attorney has no privilege to obtain physical evidence and then withhold
the physical evidence from the government.186
With this rule, the supreme court provided an answer to a
recurring defense dilemma: what happens when a defense lawyer
becomes aware of the location of important physical evidence? What if
the source of the defense lawyer’s knowledge is a confidential attorneyclient communication?
Alaska law is now quite clear. Upon detection of physical evidence,
the defense lawyer may do one of two things. First, the lawyer may
leave the item in the field and refrain from seizing, altering, or moving
it. The lawyer could then validly claim that any attorney-client
communication that revealed the location of the item is privileged and
rely upon familiar confidential attorney-client communication principles
to resist the item’s compelled disclosure.187 On the other hand, if the
attorney (or her investigator) physically seizes the item, the act of seizure
operates as a waiver of attorney-client privilege as to the time,
circumstances, manner, and subsequent handling of the item.188
This rule makes sense because, by seizing the item, the attorney
deprives the police of the opportunity to discover and observe the item
in its original location. The defense attorney who intentionally
withholds the seized item from police runs the risk of being found in
violation of a rule against evidence tampering or hindering
prosecution.189 Therefore, this rule prevents the defense lawyer and her
investigator from engaging in a “race” against the police to seize and
conceal physical evidence.

184. Amending Criminal Rule 16(c)(6) Concerning Disclosure of Physical
Evidence by the Defense, Supreme Court Order 1444, effective Oct. 15, 2001;
Supreme Court Order 1191, supra note 137.
185. 575 P.2d 1200, 1210–11 (Alaska 1978); see also McCormick v. Municipality
of Anchorage, 999 P.2d 155, 163 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000) (holding that a motorist’s
blood drawn by and held by attorney following DWI arrest was subject to
prosecution’s search warrant and was not privileged); State v. Clark, No. A-2866,
1989 WL 1594926, at *2 (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 7, 1989).
186. Morrell, 575 P.2d at 1210.
187. See ALASKA R. EVID. 503(b).
188. See Clutchette v. Rushen, 770 F.2d 1469, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1985); People v.
Meredith, 631 P.2d 46, 54 (Cal. 1981).
189. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.56.610(a), 770(a) (2006).
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IV. REGULATION OF DISCOVERY: CRIMINAL RULES 16(d) AND 17
This part will deal with provisions of Rules 16 and 17 that govern
both parties’ conduct. In particular, this part will discuss what actions
neither side may take, as well as the general discretionary power of the
trial court to restrict discovery and also the use of the subpoena power
to obtain evidence.
A.

Neither Side May Instruct Witnesses Not to Speak to the
Opposing Party

In State v. Murtagh, 190 the supreme court stated that Rule 16(d)(1) of
the Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure “prohibits both the prosecution
and the defense from advising witnesses ‘to refrain from discussing the
case with opposing counsel’ and likewise prohibits ‘otherwise
imped[ing] opposing counsel’s investigation of the case.’”191
The Murtagh court approvingly quoted the 1993 ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice, which states that, if asked by a witness, it is not
improper for a criminal practitioner to inform witnesses that interviews
with opposing counsel are not legally required.192 Counsel may tell the
witness that the witness may contact one attorney prior to speaking with
the other attorney.193 An attorney may inform the witness that it is
proper to request an opportunity for both attorneys to be present at the
interview—as long as the lawyer does not use this tactic as a means to
block opposing counsel’s investigation.194 The supreme court also noted
that it is proper to caution witnesses regarding signing a statement
prepared by another person.195 The Murtagh court noted that the ABA
Standards place similar restrictions on the defense.196 Similarly, the court
of appeals has stated that it is ethically improper for a prosecutor to
influence a witness to claim a privilege.197
B.

Neither Party May Ignore Its Continuing Discovery Obligation

Both parties’ discovery obligations are continuing ones.198 If new,
discoverable information is identified, opposing counsel must be
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

169 P.3d 602 (Alaska 2007).
Id. at 610 (quoting ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(1)) (alteration in original).
Id. at 610–11.
Id.
Id. at 610.
Id.
Id. at 610 n.39.
Spencer v. State, 642 P.2d 1371, 1376 n.3 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(2).
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“promptly” notified.199 If the new information is discovered “during
trial,” the party must also notify the court.200
A common application of this rule occurs when the prosecution
decides to call rebuttal witnesses to contradict facts presented by the
defense’s case-in-chief. If the prosecution has not previously provided
the rebuttal witnesses’ record of criminal convictions, it is required to do
so as soon as the prosecutor’s intent to call the rebuttal witness is
formed, which is probably in the midst of the defense’s case-in-chief.
Failure to do so constitutes a violation of this rule.201
C.

Neither Party May Freely Disclose Certain Discovery
Information to Third Parties

Rule 16(d)(3) states that discovery must be kept in the exclusive
custody of counsel if the information is:
(i) a criminal history record of a victim or witness;
(ii) a medical, psychiatric, psychological, or counseling record
of a victim or witness;
(iii) an adoption record;
(iv) a record that is confidential under AS 47.12.300 [juvenile
records] or a similar law in another jurisdiction;
(v) a report of a presentence investigation of a victim or
witness prepared pursuant to Criminal Rule 32 or a similar
law in another jurisdiction;
(vi) a record of the Department of Corrections other than an
incident report relating to the crime with which the
defendant is charged; or
(vii) any other record that the court orders be kept in the
exclusive custody of the attorney.202
Note that if either party wishes to prevent disclosure, the
appropriate remedy is an application for a restriction order under Rule
16(d)(3)(A)(vii).203
The rule places limitations on how much information the defense
lawyer may disclose directly to the defendant.204 The rule also places

199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Herrera v. State, No. A-6171, 1997 WL 367214, at *5 (Alaska Ct. App. June
4, 1997) (holding that it was error for the Government not to produce conviction
records of its rebuttal witnesses).
202. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(3)(A).
203. Id.
204. See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(3)(B)–(C).
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restrictions on a pro se defendant’s access to a witness’s conviction
record.205
D.

The Court Retains Broad Discretion to Limit or Defer Discovery

Probably the most overlooked facet of Rule 16 is the provision that
expressly permits either party to make applications for restriction of
discovery ex parte and in camera.206 Rule 16(d)(4) provides the trial
judge with broad discretion, upon a showing of good cause, to order
that discovery be “restricted or deferred” so long as the party that is
entitled to the discovery receives it in time to permit “beneficial use
thereof.”207 Rule 16(d)(6) expressly permits the application to be brought
ex parte, without service upon opposing counsel, and in camera,
undisclosed on the public record.208
As we have seen, Alaska criminal discovery is primarily a one-way
street.209 For this reason, it will be the prosecutor who most frequently
invokes the rules that allow an ex parte application for deferral and
restriction of otherwise mandatory discovery. And what a useful tool
the rule provides. Considered together, Rules 16(d)(4) and (d)(6) place a
powerful tool in the hands of the creative prosecutor-investigator team.
Consider this example: A homicide investigator informs the
prosecutor that a jailhouse informant has contacted the police and
disclosed that an in-custody, represented, pre-trial homicide defendant
has made significant jailhouse admissions regarding the charged
homicide.210 The informant also claims that the suspect has made
significant admissions regarding a second, uncharged violent crime.
205. See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(3)(D) (stating that when criminal history
records of witnesses are provided to a pro se defendant, the court shall order
that the defendant restrict the custody and use of the records and advise the pro
se defendant that a violation of the order is punishable as contempt); see also
Rodes v. City of Kenai, No. A-5536, 1996 WL 33686482, at *4–5 (Alaska Ct. App.
Feb. 21, 1996).
206. See ALASKA. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(6).
207. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(4).
208. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(6).
209. See Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774, 785 (Alaska 1974) (expressly pointing out
that ascertainment of facts in criminal proceedings is “a one-way street” in
which the defendant has the right to stand silent while the prosecutor attempts
to meet his burden of proof) (quoting Jones v. Superior Court of Nevada County,
372 P.2d 919, 924 (Cal. 1962)).
210. This example is drawn from the author’s practice. Several years ago, the
author filed such an ex parte, in camera motion to defer discovery in a jailhouse
homicide informant case. The judge granted the motion. See State v. Garrison,
3AN-S01-5461 Cr. (original documents on file with the author). Garrison has
now been sentenced for two homicides. The cases are closed and the documents
relating to this deferral motion are unsealed and open to public inspection.
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Whether true or not, the informant’s report is clearly discoverable
by the target’s defense counsel pursuant to Rule 16(b)(1)(ii).211 However,
the chief investigator tells the prosecutor that the investigative team
needs time. Given several weeks of delay, the investigative team might
be able to corroborate the admissions and further solidify the proof as to
the charged homicide, and may be able to solve the uncharged case.
The prosecutor has a dilemma. The discovery rule requires
disclosure, but delayed discovery is clearly in the interest of law
enforcement and public safety. If the statements were immediately
disclosed to the defense, the defendant might contact collaborators,
destroy physical evidence, and silence third-party witnesses. The police
officers’ opportunity to interview other witnesses may evaporate, and
the physical safety of the jailhouse informant may be jeopardized.
Rules 16(d)(4) and (d)(6) offer a realistic solution. The prosecutor
should make an ex parte and in camera request for an order delaying
discovery of the defendant’s oral admissions. The prosecutor’s motion
should be filed under seal and supported by the investigator’s affidavit
which explains the suspect’s admissions; the investigator’s interest in
pursuing the new leads; and the possible danger to the informant, to the
investigation, and to third parties should the motion be denied. The
prosecutor should ask for an order deferring discovery of the motion
until a certain date (for instance, a specific date several weeks distant) or
thirty days before trial, whichever occurs first. Finally, the prosecutor
should ask that the motion remain sealed and retained in chambers until
that date to avoid inadvertent dissemination within the court system.
Such a procedure would allow the investigators precious time to track
down new leads and to arrange for the informant’s movement to
another custody facility.212
Prosecutors could conceivably employ an ex parte, in camera
request to defer discovery in other contexts. A prosecutor could request
ex parte, in camera review of a crime victim’s otherwise confidential
psychological counseling,213 medical,214 or pre-sentence report records.215
211. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(ii) (mandatory disclosure of the accused’s
statements, whether recorded or not); Marshall v. State, 198 P.3d 567, 574
(Alaska Ct. App. 2008) (state’s failure to disclose statements attributable to
defendant gleaned from an interview with a cooperating informant constituted a
discovery violation).
212. Such an order would be consistent with one stated objective of Criminal
Rule 16, albeit a seldom-cited one: the rule’s deferential goal of “effective law
enforcement.” ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(a).
213. See Bourdon v. State, Nos. A-7689, A-7699, 2002 WL 31761482, at *4
(Alaska Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2002) (approving trial judge’s conclusion that there
was no good faith basis that an in camera review of counseling records would
lead to disclosure of favorable evidence); see also Fox v. State, 685 P.2d 1267, 1273
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Similarly, well-settled Alaska case law permits ex parte, in camera
review of questioned police officer personnel records.216
E.

Subpoena Power

Criminal Rule 17(c) allows either party to subpoena documents to
court (subpoena duces tecum) from the records’ custodian.217 Upon
application, meaning motion and order, the court may allow the parties’
inspection of the materials prior to trial.218 However, practitioners
should note that litigants may not subpoena documents to their offices, as
this is an abuse of process.219

V. PRACTICE ISSUES
This Part will deal with issues that typically arise during criminal
trials and investigations. It is organized in three sections. First, discovery
issues regarding juror information will be discussed. Second, the law
concerning the timing of discovery disclosures will be reviewed. Third,

(Alaska Ct. App. 1984) (affirming the trial court’s decision not to allow the
defense to review the juvenile record of victim of alleged sexual assault after an
in camera inspection); Spencer v. State, 642 P.2d 1371, 1375–76 (Alaska Ct. App.
1982) (agreeing with the trial court’s decision not to release the mental records of
defendant’s estranged wife, a primary prosecution witness, after an in camera
inspection).
214. See Page v. State, Nos. A-3551, A-5754, 1997 WL 45119, at *5–6 (Alaska
Ct. App. Feb. 5, 1997) (upholding the trial court’s decision to not disclose the
victim’s medical records after an in camera inspection).
215. See Johnson v. State, 889 P.2d 1076, 1081–82 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995)
(denying disclosure of a victim’s pre-sentence report records after an in camera
inspection).
216. See March v. State, 859 P.2d 714, 717–18 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993). The fact
that these ex parte procedures are established in Alaska procedural and
decisional law is important because Alaska’s Code of Judicial Conduct includes
a presumptive ban on all ex parte litigant-judicial contacts, with certain limited
exceptions, including when “expressly authorized by law.” See ALASKA CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3B(7)(a).
217. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 17(c).
218. Id.
219. See Wyatt v. State, No. A-3607, 1997 WL 250441, at *6 (Alaska Ct. App.
May 14, 1997) (approving in dicta that the trial judge properly imposed
sanctions upon a prosecutor who used an ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 17(c) subpoena to
compel delivery of bank records to his office rather than to the court), aff’d,
Wyatt v. State, 981 P.2d 109 (Alaska 1999); see also Fajeriak v. State, 520 P.2d 795,
800 (Alaska 1974) (criticizing district attorney who subpoenaed witnesses to his
office rather than to court); Page, 1997 WL 45119, at *6–7 (implying that ALASKA
R. CRIM. P. 17(c) contemplates document production by the custodian to the
court, not directly to the attorney).
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this section will examine what information a prosecutor is not required
to disclose.
A. Juror Information
In Tagala v. State,220 the court of appeals stated:
We believe that the prosecutor should disclose to the defense,
upon request, criminal records of jurors, at least in cases where
the prosecution intends to rely on them. If the state is entitled
to examine criminal records of jurors for jury selection, it is fair
for the defense to have access to the same information.221
However, if the prosecutor’s office compiles more than a juror’s
“criminal records,” such as background information or prior results in
cases where that person served as a juror, the information is probably
protected under Criminal Rule 16(b)(8) as work product.222
B.

Timing of Disclosure

With few exceptions,223 Criminal Rule 16 does not establish an
express discovery timeline.224 Rule 3.8(d) of the Alaska Rules of

220. 812 P.2d 604 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
221. Id. at 613.
222. Ingles v. State, Nos. A-6157, A-3731, 1997 WL 796504, at *1–2 (Alaska Ct.
App. Dec. 24, 1997) (holding that in-house Fairbanks District Attorney’s juror
background records were not discoverable); Hiser v. State, No. A-4980, 1994 WL
16196673, at *1 n.1 (Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 23, 1994) (concluding that the trial
judge properly denied request for juror police contact records and results of
prior interviews on voir dire because, if such material existed, it was protected
as government work product).
223. See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(B) (requiring government expert
disclosure “as soon as known and no later than forty-five days before trial”);
ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(c)(4) (requiring defense expert disclosure thirty days
before trial); ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(c)(5) (requiring notice of statutory and special
defenses ten days before trial).
224. Some Alaska trial courts have attempted to impose “standing orders”
which purport to establish rigid discovery timelines, but such “local orders” are
of questioned validity. In Alaska, rulemaking authority is reserved to the Alaska
Supreme Court, not the lower trial courts. See ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 15.
Rulemaking is governed by administrative rule. ALASKA R. OF ADMIN. 44(a),
46(b) (providing for statewide court system uniformity in rulemaking and
vesting all rulemaking power in the supreme court). Of course, the nuanced
constitutional argument regarding the validity of a local discovery rule would
be of little utility to a prosecutor faced with a skeptical trial judge’s pointed
inquiry about why police reports and taped statements had not been disclosed
to the defender within a certain number of days of arraignment, e.g., “as is the
long standing order in my courtroom.” The wise prosecutor would best leave the
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Professional Conduct merely says that the prosecutor must provide
“timely” discovery.225 The professional conduct rule does not define
“timely.”
In In Re Attorney C,226 the Colorado Supreme Court was recently
required to construe an identically-worded ethical rule. There, the
prosecutor did not disclose “witness recant statements” until after a
preliminary hearing.227 The Colorado court held that the prosecutor’s
obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence meant that disclosure should
be accomplished prior to the next “critical stage” of the case.228
In 2007, a disciplinary hearing committee of the North Carolina Bar
relied on this case when imposing disbarment upon Michael Nifong,
prosecutor for the botched Duke lacrosse team sexual assault case.229 In
the wake of Attorney C and the Nifong disbarment hearing, no
prosecutor should allow a preliminary hearing, a grand jury, or a
motions deadline to pass with significant undisclosed discovery sitting
on her desk.
The timing of government disclosure is a frequently recurring
issue. Due to a criminal defendant’s right to a speedy trial,230 criminal
cases proceed to trial far more quickly than civil lawsuits. Unlike civil
practitioners, who have the luxury of deposing all important witnesses
and compelling disclosure of most important facts months (or years)
before jury trial, criminal practitioners are often thrust into trial with
undiscovered facts lurking in the weeds.
There is no discovery violation if the government discovers new
information or the identity of an important witness on the eve of (or in
the midst of) trial and then discloses this information immediately
because the prosecution and defense learn of the information at
approximately the same time.231

effete constitutional bickering for another day and comply with the local
practice.
225. ALASKA R. PROF. CONDUCT 3.8(d).
226. 47 P.3d 1167 (Colo. 2002).
227. Id. at 1168.
228. Id. at 1171–72.
229. See N.C. State Bar v. Nifong, 06 D.H.C. 35 (June 16, 2007), available at
http://www.ncbar.com/Nifong%20Findings.pdf.
230. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 45.
231. See Buie v. State, No. A-4706, 1995 WL 17220362, *10–12 (Alaska Ct. App.
Mar. 29, 1995) (finding no violation where prosecution immediatley disclosed
identity of witness to defense); see also Butler v. State, No. A-9562, 2008 WL
4890238, at *9 (Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2008) (“From time to time, new
information will be revealed at a criminal trial that aids one side or the other, or
that hurts one side or the other. To a certain extent, this is an expectable
consequence of calling witnesses into court to testify under oath and to be
subjected to cross-examination.”).

FAYETTE_FINAL.DOC

84
C.

5/8/2009 2:30:56 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

VOL. 26:1

Is There Anything a Prosecutor May Refuse to Disclose?
1.

The Defense Is Not Entitled to the Prosecution’s Witness List (and
the Prosecutor Should Not Expect One From the Defense)
The prosecution is not required to provide the defense a formal
civil-litigation-like witness list. The defense is entitled to disclosure of
the names and addresses, and disclosure of statements of witnesses and
the accused.232 But Rule 16 does not require the prosecutor to commit,
before trial, to a detailed “script” of witnesses who will actually be
called at trial.
In Savo v. State,233 the defendant argued that he was unfairly
surprised by two prosecution witnesses because he never received
formal notice that the prosecutor would call the witnesses at trial.234 The
court of appeals rejected the argument and held that the rule merely
required that the state provide Savo with “[t]he names and addresses of
persons known by the government to have knowledge of relevant facts
and their written or recorded statements or summaries of [their]
statements.”235 The prosecution had done that.236 Thus, the rule requires
disclosure of a broader group of persons than intended witnesses, but it
does not require the state to specify who it actually intends to call.237
In Howe v. State,238 the supreme court explained why a rule
requiring a definitive prosecution commitment of the identity of precise
trial witnesses was impractical.239 The supreme court noted that, often
times, a prosecutor will not know until shortly before (or during) trial
precisely whom he intends to call to the stand due to witness
unpredictability and availability.240 The court noted that, in criminal
cases, serious trial preparation often does not commence until “shortly
before trial” due to the “mass of the more routine criminal cases.”241
May a trial judge require the defense to disclose a “witness list” of
potential (non-expert) defense witnesses? As a matter of federal
constitutional law, the answer is clearly “yes.”242 But, the answer is
completely different as a matter of Alaska constitutional law. In the
232. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1).
233. No. A-7884, 2002 WL 1467430 (Alaska Ct. App. July 10, 2002).
234. Id.
235. Id. at *1 (quoting ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(A)(i)).
236. Id.
237. Id. at *2; see also Bremond v. State, No. A-5019, 1994 WL 16196672, at *2
(Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 23, 1994) (”Criminal Rule 16 (b)(1)(i) does not require the
state to provide the defendant with a list of its trial witnesses”).
238. 589 P.2d 421 (Alaska 1979).
239. See id. at 424 n.7.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970).
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wake of Scott v. State,243 one would think that the answer to this question
in an Alaska state courtroom would be well-settled in the negative.
However, in Elson v. State,244 the trial judge ordered the defense to
disclose its witness list to facilitate meaningful voir dire.245 The judge
coupled this order with another order barring the prosecution staff from
contacting the witnesses whose names he compelled the defense lawyer
to reveal in open court.246 The defense lawyer objected but ultimately
disclosed the names of several potential witnesses.247 The court of
appeals assumed, “without deciding,” that the trial judge’s order
violated Scott but found the error harmless.248
In a trial held nine years after Scott was decided, a trial judge in
another small Alaska community did the same thing. In Smaker v.
State,249 the trial judge not only required the defense attorney to
announce the names of prospective witnesses, but when the defense
lawyer sought to add another witness to the list in the midst of trial, the
trial judge denied the request and precluded the witness’s testimony.250
The court of appeals found an abuse of discretion and reversed the
conviction.251
In the wake of 1974’s Scott holding and 1997’s State v.
Summerville,252 no Alaska prosecutor should expect an Alaska trial judge
to compel a defense non-expert witness list.

243. 519 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1974). The Scott court held that a pre-trial order
requiring a criminal defendant to reveal the names and addresses of his
potential witnesses violated article I, section 9 of the Alaska Constitution
because it was compelled, testimonial, and incriminating. Id. at 786–87.
244. Nos. A-2898, A-4297, 1993 WL 13156823 (Alaska Ct. App. July 28, 1993).
245. Id. at *5.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at *6. It is clear that the Elson trial judge’s order precluding the police
from contacting any witness whose name was revealed by the defense
compounded his error. The trial judge’s order essentially ordered an executive
branch police agency to stop investigating a crime. The judge had no such
authority. Such an order is clearly contrary to public safety policy goals and runs
squarely afoul of separation of powers principles. See Public Defender Agency v.
Superior Court, Third Judicial Dist., 534 P.2d 947, 950 (Alaska 1975) (“When an
act is committed to executive discretion, the exercise of that discretion within
constitutional bounds is not subject to the control or review of the courts.”).
249. 695 P.2d 238 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
250. Id. at 239–40 (“The Court: ‘You do have a duty to name the witnesses at
jury selection. And I’ve always required that for nine years and I’ve told every
counsel that they have a duty to do it and that’s why I told you to put the
[]witnesses on the board.’”).
251. Id. at 241.
252. 948 P.2d 469, 469–70 (Alaska 1997) (per curiam) (“[T]he names of nonalibi witnesses and their statements cannot be constitutionally compelled.”).
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2.

The Defense Is Not Entitled to Force the Prosecutor to Distinguish
Between Case-in-Chief and Rebuttal Witnesses
Criminal Rule 16 does not require the prosecutor to identify which
potential witnesses may be called as rebuttal witnesses. The reason is
obvious: the prosecutor will have no way to predict, at the beginning of
trial, the content of the defense’s case-in-chief or if the defense will
present a case at all. Therefore, the rule does not require the prosecution
to blindly handcuff itself to an advance script of its rebuttal case before it
knows what it will be called upon to rebut.253 Nor may a defendant
demand that the prosecutor reveal its anticipated case-in-rebuttal plan
before the defense rests.254
3.

The Defense Is Not Entitled to the Prosecutor’s Written List of
Questions to Anticipated Witnesses
In Thomas v. State,255 the prosecutor called a social worker to the
stand in a child sexual abuse prosecution.256 The witness brought with
her a list of questions which the prosecutor had given her.257 On the list,
the witness had jotted her anticipated answers.258 The defense attorney
asked to see the list, and cited Evidence Rule 612.259 The judge ordered
disclosure of the witness’s answers but denied discovery of the
questions.260 The trial judge ruled that disclosure of the list of questions
was protected “work product.”261
Perhaps surprisingly, the court of appeals affirmed the trial judge
on this basis, concluding that the witness had not used the document to

253. Charles v. State, No. A-8546, 2003 WL 23011811, at *2 (Alaska Ct. App.
Dec. 24, 2003) (“[T]he discovery contemplated by [Criminal Rule 16(b)(1)(A)(i)]
is intended to take place at an early stage in the proceedings, and at that stage
the prosecution often will have no clear idea who [among the persons having
relevant knowledge] will be presented as witnesses at trial and who, among the
witnesses, will be presented in the case in chief and who will be reserved for
rebuttal.” (quoting Howe v. State, 589 P.2d 421, 424 (Alaska 1979)) (alteration in
original)).
254. Elson v. State, Nos. A-2898, A-4297, 1993 WL 13156823, at *8 (Alaska Ct.
App. July 28, 1993) (rejecting defense’s claim that the prosecution should have
been required to reveal its intended case-in-rebuttal before deciding whether to
rest the defense’s case-in-chief).
255. No. A-6015, 1997 WL 235504 (Alaska Ct. App. May 7, 1997).
256. Id. at *8.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Under Alaska Rule of Evidence 612(a), a defendant is entitled to examine
“[a]ny writing . . . used by [the witness] to refresh [her] memory while
testifying.” Rule 612(c) directs a trial judge to examine the document in camera,
excise any privileged material from the document, then order disclosure of the
rest.
260. Thomas, 1997 WL 235504, at *8.
261. Id.
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refresh her recollection and that the list of questions was protected work
product.262 This outcome is questionable. An attorney should not rely on
work-product principles to protect a document freely given to a witness
and then carried by the witness to the stand.263 However, the Thomas
trial judge’s ruling disclosing the witness’s written answers was clearly
correct. If the witness creates a written summary of anticipated answers,
this “written statement” is clearly discoverable.264
4.

The Defense Is Not Entitled to Discovery of the Prosecution’s Chief
Investigating Officer’s Notes Made During Trial in the Courtroom
In Alaska criminal practice, the prosecutor is often permitted to
have the investigative agency’s chief investigating officer sit at counsel
table with her in order to assist in the presentation of evidence.
Especially in a complex case, the chief detective’s assistance is often
critical. Often, the chief investigating officer will also be a trial witness
on the merits.265
What if a sharp-eyed defense lawyer spots the detective passing
written notes back and forth with the prosecutor? Wouldn’t such notes
constitute a “written statement” of a witness and be subject to
disclosure?266 The answer is no. In Smith v. State,267 this very issue arose.
The court of appeals concluded that the notes which passed between the
investigating officer were protected work product and were based upon
the same trial testimony the defendant and his lawyer had witnessed.268
Therefore, they were not discoverable.269

262. Id. at *9.
263. Lowery v. State, 762 P.2d 457, 460 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (stating that
work-product protection is waived by calling the witness to the stand as to
matters covered by the testimony).
264. See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(A)(i); cf. Smith v. State, No. A-6183, 1997
WL 688646, at *3–4 (Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 5, 1997) (holding that the prosecutor’s
failure to preserve and disclose a diagram drawn by a witness during a pre-trial
interview was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt, primarily because the
diagram was similar to an earlier diagram the witness had drawn for police).
265. Alaska’s evidence rules allow the trial judge to exempt the chief
investigating officer from the witness exclusion rule. See ALASKA R. EVID. 615(3).
266. See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(i).
267. No. A-6183, 1997 WL 688646 (Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 5, 1997).
268. Id. at *2.
269. Id.
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5.

The Defense Is Not Entitled to the Prosecutor’s Pre-trial Interview
Notes of Witness Interviews—as Long as the Witness Statements
are Inculpatory, and the Substance Has Already Been Disclosed
As explained above,270 if a prosecutor conducts an unrecorded
interview of a trial witness before trial—provided that the witness is not
a co-defendant—and learns of new, inculpatory facts, Alaska’s criminal
discovery rule technically does not compel discovery of the new fact.271
However, prosecutors must be cautious: this answer changes if the pretrial interview is recorded,272 reduced to writing,273 or discloses an
exculpatory or mitigating fact.274 Finally, prosecutors who learn new,
discoverable facts in the midst of trial are required to notify both the
defense attorney and the court of the new development.275
Notwithstanding Sivertsen v. State, given the court of appeals’
frequent suggestion that this quirk in Rule 16 is subject to prosecutorial
manipulation,276 and given Rule 16’s stated objectives of minimizing
trial delay and surprise,277 the cautious prosecutor should voluntarily
document and disclose newly discovered facts.
6.

The Defense Is Not Entitled to Broad, “Anti-constitutionalist”
Discovery
Alaska has no shortage of rugged individualists who vigorously
assert personal and political independence from government control.
Periodically, Alaska criminal courts are confronted with pro se litigants
270. See supra Part II.A.
271. Sivertsen v. State, 963 P.2d 1069, 1071–72 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998),
disapproved in part on other grounds, 981 P.2d 564 (Alaska 1999) (holding that
Criminal Rule 16(b)(1) does not normally require a prosecutor to disclose oral
statements made by a witness during a trial preparation interview); see also Nook
v. State, No. A-7837, 2004 WL 1336268, at *5 (Alaska Ct. App. June 16, 2004)
(holding that pre-trial interview statement was not discoverable under Brady, or
Rule 16(b)(3) because it was not exculpatory at the time it was made). In a pretrial interview, witness claimed that defendant had kicked victim fifteen times
causing death, but in a statement to police, witness claimed that defendant
kicked victim twenty or twenty-five times. Id.
272. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(A)(i).
273. Id.
274. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(3).
275. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(2).
276. Sivertsen, 963 P.2d at 1072. (“We recognize that this interpretation of
Criminal Rule 16(b)(1)(i) could be abused.”); see also Elson v. State, Nos. A-2898,
A-4297, 1993 WL 13156823, at *12–14 (Alaska Ct. App. July 28, 1993) (recognizing
that such a rule may encourage the prosecutor to abuse the system by simply
refusing to make any recordings of interviews); Shaw v. State, No. A-3697, 1992
WL 12153173, at *10 (Alaska Ct. App. May 6, 1992) (acknowledging the potential
for abuse by not creating written or recorded evidence).
277. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(a).
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who actively dispute the authority of Alaska’s state court system, state
political subdivisions, and state legal institutions. Some of these litigants
deny the constitutional authority of the state to adjudicate their criminal
misconduct at all.278
What if such “anti-constitutionalists” demand broad “discovery”
aimed at disclosure of documents which they claim might undermine
the authority of the government to bring the defendant before its courts?
Such broad “anti-constitutionalist” discovery falls outside the ambit of
Rule 16. For example, in Collier v. Municipality of Anchorage,279 the
defendant sought information concerning the creation of the courts, the
chartering of Anchorage, “the true name of his ‘government’ accuser,
IRS documents, and police operating procedures.”280 This request was
denied at trial and the decision was affirmed by the court of appeals,
which held that Rule 16 did not require any such disclosures and,
furthermore, that the information requested was not relevant because it
had no bearing on the defendant’s guilt.281
7.

The Defense Is Not Entitled to Have the Prosecution Gather
Information for It
A fundamental premise underlying Rule 16 is that the government
is required to disclose certain broad categories of existing information to
a criminal defendant. However, Rule 16 does not compel the
government to become the defense attorney’s investigative or litigation
research staff. In other words, the government is not required to actively
assist the defendant in the preparation of her case by creating
documents that do not already exist.
In State v. Clark,282 the trial judge precluded an informant from
testifying at trial because, immediately on the eve of trial, he revealed
278. One is struck by the frequency with which litigants’ challenges to the
authority of state legal institutions arise in cases from Palmer. See, e.g., Crane v.
State, 118 P.3d 1084 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005) (rejecting challenge upon the
authority of the Bar Association); Winterrowd v. State, No. A-9588, 2007 WL
1378154, at *4 (Alaska Ct. App. May 9, 2007) (challenging police officers’
authority).
279. 138 P.3d 719 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006)
280. Id. at 721.
281. Id. at 722; see also Gladden v. State, 153 P.3d 1028, 1033 (Alaska Ct. App.
2007) (refusing pro se defendant’s request concering “lawyers” and “the bar
association,” or documents proving that his prosecutor and trial judge were
“public officers of the State of Alaska”); Winterrowd, 2007 WL 1378154, at *4
(affirming decision refusing to compel prosecution to produce documents that
would prove that police officers were “public officers with police powers”);
Allen v. State, Nos. A-7183, A-4376, 2001 WL 357133, at *3–4 (Alaska Ct. App.
Apr. 11, 2001) (affirming refusal to disclose correctional facility policies in a
jailhouse assault on officer case).
282. 568 P.2d 406 (Alaska 1977).
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that he had used an alias.283 The trial judge ruled that the prosecution
had not used due diligence in discovering the informant’s true identity
and ruled that he would be precluded from testifying at trial.284 The
prosecution appealed, and the supreme court reversed.285 Justice
Connor, writing for the court, explained that, “Nothing in Rule 16
requires the prosecution to discover information which it does not
possess or control, or to prepare the defendant’s case for him.”286
Instead, the rule is limited to instances where the state actually
possessed the requested information.287
Prosecutors should be watchful for aggressive defense production
requests and carefully identify those demanding production of
documents which already exist and those demanding a government
agency create a document that does not yet exist. Where the defense
requests information that does not already exist, Clark precludes a trial
judge from ordering its production.288
This issue occasionally arises where a defense lawyer points to a
police computer dispatch printout that discloses that half a dozen police
officers arrived on-scene at a street crime investigation. As is often the
case, only two or three officers may have submitted formal, written
reports. The defense attorney demands an explanation. The prosecutor
responds that each of the officers that conducted substantive
investigations wrote and submitted reports and the others did not.
Unsatisfied, and wary of undisclosed significant facts, the defense
attorney demands an affirmative showing that the other officers wrote
no report or an affirmative statement from the other officers that they
did no substantive investigation. May a judge order the other police

283. Id. at 407–08. Of course, an alias is merely a specific false claim of
identity. As Judge Coats explained, ”[n]either the cases nor Criminal Rule 16
specifically requires the state to produce for the defendant evidence showing
that a witness has been dishonest on particular occasions.” Burke v. State, No. A4683, 1993 WL 13156813, at *1 n.2 (Alaska Ct. App. Aug. 4, 1993).
284. Clark, 568 P.2d at 407–08.
285. Id. at 408.
286. Id.
287. Id.; see also Rodes v. City Of Kenai, No. A-5536, 1996 WL 33686482, at *5
n.6 (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 21, 1996) (“The city was not required to create and
produce written or recorded statements that it did not possess or that did not
exist.”).
288. See Westbrook v. State, No. A-8464, 2003 WL 22723488, at *3 (Alaska Ct.
App. Nov. 19, 2003). Of course, where a document exists in the possession of a
third party, but it has not been seized by police, the defendant may move for a
subpoena under Rules 16(b)(5) and (7), and 17(c). See supra Part II.F.
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officers to create reports describing what they did or did not do at the
scene? No. Such an order would run squarely afoul of Clark.289
8. Defense Fishing Expeditions
What if the defense files a pre-trial motion requesting that the
prosecution provide police reports regarding every single witness’s past
law enforcement contacts?290 Prosecutors should oppose such “fishing
expeditions,” and defenders should be prepared to counter and
articulate why they have a good faith basis for the request.291
Alaska law restricts a defendant’s ability to engage in a broadranging “fishing expedition” for impeachment and cross-examination
material—especially where that “fishing expedition” will trigger a
prosecution request for in camera review of any questioned materials.
In Johnson v. State,292 the defendant was prosecuted for contributing
to the delinquency of a minor.293 Johnson engaged in “grooming”
behavior with a 15-year-old boy and his 13-year-old sister and, on
several occasions, had helped them run away from home.294 Johnson’s
defense was that the children’s father was abusive and, before trial, he
filed discovery motions aimed at discovering specific details of the
father’s abusive behavior.295 The trial judge denied the motions, and the
court of appeals affirmed because there was no evidence that Johnson
was aware of the abuse at the time of his alleged crime.296

289. See also Charles v. State, No. A-8546, 2003 WL 23011811, at *2 (Alaska Ct.
App. Dec. 24, 2003) (“[W]e have held that Criminal Rule 16(b) does not impose a
duty on the prosecutor or police to create a written summary of a witness’s oral
statements made shortly before trial.”) (citing Sivertsen v. State, 963 P.2d 1069,
1071–72 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998), disapproved in part, but on other grounds, 981 P.2d
564 (Alaska 1999)).
290. Cf. Coney v. State, 699 P.2d 899, 901 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (remanding
to allow parties to argue the relevancy of victim’s arrest record where the victim
was the prosecution’s most critical witness, and where the defense squarely
pointed at the victim as the “real suspect.”).
291. “[T]he party seeking judicial [in camera] review must provide the court
with some reason to justify a detailed review of the materials—some reason to
suppose that the materials will contain pertinent information. . . . [A] party has
no right to demand that the trial judge conduct an in camera examination of
confidential records or other privileged materials based merely on the possibility
that these records might contain something that could be used to impeach a
witness’s general credibility or the witness’s testimony on collateral issues.”
Risinger v. State, Nos. A-6374, A-3849, 1998 WL 411300, at *2 (Alaska Ct. App.
July 22, 1998).
292. No. A-6402, 1998 WL 191152 (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 22, 1998).
293. Id. at *1.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
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Johnson is consistent with subsequent Alaska cases holding that a
defendant’s discovery rights are broad but not limitless. To be entitled to
disclosure of otherwise undiscoverable information, the defense must
offer more than a generalized assertion that the information might lead
to impeachment evidence.297
However, prosecutors should exercise great care in the area of selfdefense and justification cases. At least one earlier unpublished opinion
is seemingly at odds with Johnson. In Roseman v. State,298 a police officer
was prosecuted for use of excessive force upon an arrestee.299 After
conviction, he moved for a new trial, arguing that he was improperly
denied discovery of a police report that showed the arrestee had fought
with a police officer in the past.300 The trial judge denied the motion, but
the court of appeals reversed, reasoning that the prosecution’s
suppression of the police report was not harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.301
As an evidentiary issue, Roseman is of questioned validity now,
because Roseman would be prohibited from introducing the arrestee’s
prior specific violent act at trial unless Roseman was subjectively aware
of that event when he used force against him.302
But the prosecutor’s obligation to discover exculpatory information
is independent of the information’s admissibility. Therefore, in a selfdefense (or justification) case, the prosecutor’s safest course is to
discover a full, APSIN “arrest record” printout and invite a defense
motion to compel disclosure of the full police report. If the prosecutor

297. See, e.g., Cockerham v. State, 933 P.2d 537, 543–44 (Alaska 1997) (stating a
“defendant’s right to access information . . . is not absolute”); see also Linne v.
State, 674 P.2d 1345, 1354 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (affirming the denial of a
request for discovery of “all bank records of [the victim]” in a theft prosecution
as too broad); Bourdon v. State, Nos. A-7689, A-7699, 2002 WL 31761482, at *3–4
(Alaska Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2002) (affirming denial of discovery motion seeking
medical, mental health, alcohol counseling, and anger management records
which were unrelated to charged offenses); Katelnikoff v. State, Nos. A-6848, A4064, 1999 WL 396885, at *3 (Alaska Ct. App. June 16, 1999) (affirming denial of a
“shotgun” discovery motion supported by nothing more than the hope that
Crisis Center documents might contain impeachment evidence); Cytanovich v.
State, Nos. A-6287, A-3762, 1998 WL 80110, at *3–4 (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 25,
1998) (affirming trial judge who denied motion to disclose police reports about
the victim’s drug history and violent history; trial judge only required the
prosecutor to disclose reports that she had reviewed).
298. No. A-659, 1985 WL 1078004 (Alaska Ct. App. Dec. 26, 1985).
299. Id. at *1.
300. Id. at *3–4.
301. Id. at *4–5.
302. Alaska law on this point was very confused before 1996. See James
Fayette, “‘If You Knew Him Like I Did, You’d Have Shot Him, Too . . .” A Survey of
Alaska’s Law of Self–Defense, 23 ALASKA L.R. 171, 213–14 (2006).
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has subjectively reviewed prior reports, then those should be
discovered.303
Where the defense establishes that the information it seeks is more
than Bourdon-Katelnikoff tangential or “impeachment” evidence, the
court of appeals has articulated that the trial judge must review the
information in camera.304
9. Police Officer Personnel Records and Misconduct
If the defense shows that it has a “good faith basis for asserting that
materials in an officer’s personnel file may lead to the disclosure of
favorable evidence, the trial court should conduct an in camera review”
of the personnel file and rule on disclosure.305 The defense’s entitlement
to an in camera review may be waived if it is not made in a timely
manner. A mid-trial request is untimely.306 The defense showing must
be more than a speculative “fishing expedition.”307
Prosecutors should be ever-wary of police officer misconduct
issues. A comprehensive survey of this area of the law is beyond the
scope of this article. However, prosecutors should be aware that the
Brady-Giglio-Kyles line of cases may impose a duty of disclosure
regarding verified incidents of police misconduct in the officer’s
personnel files.308 A prosecutor should proceed very cautiously if she
encounters any of the following categories of derogatory officer
information: (1) a finding of misconduct, such as a disciplinary letter,
that reflects on the officer-witness’s truthfulness; (2) a finding of
misconduct that indicates that the officer-witness may be biased; (3) a
credible allegation of misconduct, subject to pending investigation, that
reflects on the truthfulness or possible bias of the officer-witness; and (4)

303. See Cytanovich v. State, Nos. A-6287, A-3762, 1998 WL 80110, at *4
(Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 25, 1998).
304. See Johnson v. State, 889 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
305. March v. State, 859 P.2d 714, 718 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993) (italics omitted).
306. Dana v. State, 623 P.2d 348, 355 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981).
307. Id.; see also Allen v. State, Nos. A-7283, A-4376, 2001 WL 357133, at *3–4
(Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2001) (affirming refusal to disclose correctional facility
policies in a jailhouse assault on officer case).
308. See United States v. Veras, 51 F.3d 1365, 1374 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that
the defendant was entitled to disclosure of information that arresting police
officer was being investigated for fraud involving money used to pay
informants, since allegations would have been valuable for impeachment
purposes due to their unquestionably serious nature); Dreary v. Gloucester, 9
F.3d 191 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that a 10-year old disciplinary finding that an
officer falsified overtime records was admissible); cf. United States v. Ortiz, 5
F.3d 288 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that a trial court was within its discretion in
excluding a letter from an officer’s personnel file indicating that he falsely
reported hours of court attendance).
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a past criminal charge or pending criminal charge brought against the
officer-witness.
Often, the prosecutor’s safest and most defensible course is to
submit the issue to the trial judge by in camera, ex parte motion.309 The
prosecutor could seek the court’s order either directing or denying
discovery of the questioned misconduct report. If the misconduct is
ordered to be discovered, the prosecutor could seek a re-disclosure
prohibition, forbidding the defense from disseminating the report
beyond the trial defense team. The court could also direct that the
defense refrain from eliciting the derogatory information at trial absent a
prior application brought outside the jury’s presence.
D. Procedural Consequences of Discovery Practice
1. Pre-trial Motions to Compel Discovery Toll Rule 45
Alaska law is well-settled that, where a defendant seeks the court’s
order to compel the prosecution to provide requested discovery, the
motion tolls Rule 45.310
2.

The Defense Remedy for a Perceived Discovery Violation Is a
Continuance or a Mistrial—Rarely Suppression, Striking
Testimony, or Preclusion
When a discovery violation comes to light before trial, the
defendant is entitled to a continuance to re-evaluate the defense case.311
If there has been a discovery violation and new information comes to
light after trial has already started,312 and the defense has been
prejudiced, “the trial court should ordinarily grant a defendant’s request
for a mistrial.”313 The defendant is rarely entitled to outright suppression
or preclusion of the evidence. Many Alaska cases stand for this
proposition.314

309. See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(4), (6).
310. Snider v. State, 958 P.2d 1114, 1118–19 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998); Drake v.
State, 899 P.2d 1385, 1388 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
311. Friedmann v. State, 172 P.3d 831, 833 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007).
312. Not every mid-trial emergence of new evidence is a discovery violation.
If the police and the prosecution were unaware of a new fact, and that fact
surfaces in the midst of trial, and the prosecution and the defense learn of the
new fact at the same time, there is no discovery violation. See Buie v. State, No.
A-4706, 1995 WL 17220362, at *9–10 (Alaska Ct. App. March 29, 1995).
313. Friedmann, 172 P.3d at 833.
314. See, e.g., Bostic v. State, 805 P.2d 344, 347–48 (Alaska 1991); Christie v.
State, 580 P.2d 310, 312 n.2 (Alaska 1978) (stating that “dismissal is rarely an
appropriate remedy for untimely compliance with discovery”); Des Jardins v.
State, 551 P.2d 181, 187 (Alaska 1976) (stating that “[t]he proper procedure for a
trial court faced with prosecution failure to disclose to the defense evidence that
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What if the government fails to appraise the defense of the current
address of a potential witness? What if the defense alleges that, had they
been informed of the witness’s current address, they would have been
able to interview the witness? Is the defense entitled to have the
witness’s testimony stricken? No.
The court of appeals explained that, to be entitled to any remedy,
the defense must articulate prejudice, going beyond the mere inability to
interview the witness. In Calix v. State,315 a critical witness in a sexual
assault prosecution gave a statement to police and then moved to
California before trial.316 The prosecution disclosed the witness’s police
statement but failed to update discovery when the witness moved out of
state.317 On appeal, Calix argued that the witness’s testimony should
have been stricken because he was unable to interview the witness prior
to trial.318 The court of appeals found this allegation insufficient to
require the trial court to strike the witness’s testimony.319
Where the defendant moves for a new trial and establishes that the
prosecution wrongfully suppressed evidence of which it was aware, the
analysis changes sharply. Where the prosecution violates its duty of
disclosure regarding known evidence, the defendant is entitled to a new

it is required to provide, until just before it plans to use such evidence, is to
grant a continuance long enough to allow the defense attorney adequate time to
prepare”); Riney v. State, 935 P.2d 828, 838 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997) (holding that
a violation of Criminal Rule 16(b) justified a mistrial, but not suppression of the
evidence); Russell v. State, 934 P.2d 1335, 1342 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997) (holding
that the remedy for surprise evidence mid-trial is a continuance or mistrial, and
not suppression of the evidence); Wortham v. State, 689 P.2d 1133, 1142 (Alaska
Ct. App. 1984) (finding that defendant waived right to relief for alleged
discovery violation when he did not make a motion for the material or ask for
continuance, absent prejudice to him or bad faith); Mujahid v. State, No. A-9573,
2008 WL 4757152, at *3–4 (Alaska Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2008) (holding dismissal not
warranted for discovery violation which was detected and remedied mid-trial);
Yoder v. State, No. A-9882, 2008 WL 2853443, at *6 (Alaska Ct. App. July 23,
2008) (“Yoder was not entitled to a continuance or a mistrial because he did not
show any plausible way in which his defense could have been prejudiced by
these discovery problems.”); French v. State, No. A-7861, 2002 WL 54619, at *3
(Alaska Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2002) (disclosure of 911 tape on first day of trial); Lyon
v. State, Nos. A-3654, A-6219, 1997 WL 563137, at *3 (Alaska Ct. App. Sept. 10,
1997) (holding defendant was not entitled to suppression of disclosure of
Intoximeter calibration on day of trial).
315. No. A-6854, 1999 WL 34002417 (Alaska Ct. App. Oct. 13, 1999).
316. Id. at *2–3.
317. Id. at *3.
318. Id.
319. Id.
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trial unless the court is convinced that the failure to disclose the
evidence was harmless beyond reasonable doubt.320

CONCLUSION
Alaska’s criminal discovery rules place powerful tools in the hands
of the criminal defender. The rules compel timely government
disclosure of a broad spectrum of information and serve the important
public policy goal that Alaska state court defendants have a better
chance at a fair trial in state court than in other jurisdictions. One seldom
encounters a defender who doubts that an Alaska defendant is more
advantageously situated (at least in terms of discovery rights) than
defendants in other jurisdictions—such as those jurisdictions where
neither custodial interrogations nor grand jury presentations are taperecorded and where discovery rights are not enshrined in directive
criminal procedural rules. At least viewed from the defense perspective,
there can be little doubt that the framers of Alaska’s criminal discovery
procedure rules heeded Justice Brennan’s call that facts—not surprise
and maneuver—should determine the outcome of criminal cases.
Alaska’s rules certainly provide a restricted degree of discovery for
the government. With very few exceptions, an Alaska prosecutor may
not compel the defender to “tip her hand.” But, an able Alaska
prosecutor is not completely helpless. Alaska’s rules do allow
prosecutors to compel fundamental expert discovery, pre-trial notice of
defenses, and disclosure of physical evidence and also expressly permit
ex parte, in camera applications to restrict or delay discovery. As we
have seen, many of these procedural devices are useful tools in sensitive
cases.
As long as criminal justice is administered in the context of an
adversarial litigation system populated by aggressive and skilled
lawyers, discovery disputes will persist. This Article will not change
that. But this survey is offered to my criminal bar colleagues in the hope
that it will assist all criminal practitioners and judges to cogently
navigate the boundaries of each party’s discovery obligations. Lawyers
will always disagree on the facts and outcome of specific cases, but they
should at least be able agree on what the law requires and about how
courts have decided similar issues in the past.

320. Roseman v. State, No. A-659, 1985 WL 1078004, at *5 (Alaska Ct. App.
Dec. 26, 1985).

